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IN PRAISE OF NONCONFORMITY
Ira K. Lindsay*
Exemption of existing structures and land uses from new zoning
regulations is a long-standing part of zoning practice but is often
regarded as an unfortunate political concession that entrenches an
irrational distinction between present uses and future use. This Article
provides an unapologetic defense of statutory protection for these
nonconforming existing uses. Existing use protection represents a
principled position that balances the interests of property owners and
the interests of the public. Far from being an unsavoury political
compromise, protection of existing uses is a crucial component of
modern land use regulation that balances the needs of landowners for
legal certainty with the public imperative to regulate development.
Existing use protection is a vital check on the excesses of fiscal zoning
and an important protection for small businesses.
The special status of non-conforming uses is grounded both in the
nature of zoning regulation and in the normative significance of property
ownership. Existing use protection mitigates the unfairness inherent in
comprehensive zoning of subjecting landowners in different zones to
differing rules. It discourages disaffected neighbors from bypassing
common law remedies in favor of regulatory fixes and reaffirms the
function of zoning regulation as a tool to guide development to avoid
future land use conflicts rather than a means to change to rules in
response to ongoing disputes. Over time, comprehensive land use
planning has given way to greater use of ad hoc bargaining with
developers. In this context, weakening existing use protection would
give the appearance of going back on a bargain and undermine the
ability of local governments to bargain effectively. Property ownership
provides a sphere of exclusive control in which an owner can develop
her plans over time without outside interference. Existing use protection
* Author’s note. I would like to thank Bob Ellickson for suggesting this topic. For
comments on this project, I am grateful to Bill Fischel, Bob Ellickson, Andrew Verstein,
David Plunkett, Alex Sarch, Jules Coleman, Peter Railton, Allan Gibbard, Elizabeth Anderson
and Scott Hershovitz. The earliest stages of research for this article were conducted while I
was a law clerk to the late Judge Stephen F. Williams. I hope that he would have liked it.
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allows the property owner to make land use choices with confidence that
they will be respected while still permitting local governments to control
future development. In the context of onerous zoning regimes, real estate
markets play a crucial role in allowing landowners to acquire property
where they can be assured of their legal right to continue the present use
of land.
Finally, abolishing existing use protection would have undesirable
effects on property law in greatly increasing the number of takings and
due process claims by landowners. The murky nature of takings and due
process doctrine combined with the factual complexity of zoning cases
would create great legal uncertainty without providing sufficient
protection for the interests of landowners.
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I. INTRODUCTION
When the laws change, policymakers must decide how to treat
decisions made in reliance on the old rule. One option is to require
everyone to comply with the new rule immediately, regardless of
whether they have relied upon the old one. Another option is to exempt
those who have relied upon the old rule from the new rule.1 The question
of whether choices made under a prior legal regime should be exempted
from new regulations is especially fraught because either option seems
to involve a sort of unfairness. Uniform treatment under the new law
may seem unfair to those who have relied on the old law. However, if
those who have relied on the old rule are exempt from the new rule,
similarly situated people will be subject to different rules in a way that
may seem inequitable.
In zoning law, reliance on the old rule is usually treated as
exempting a landowner from the new rule. Structures and uses of land
that pre-exist a new zoning regulation are generally allowed to persist
indefinitely, albeit subject to restrictions on alteration or expansion.2
This rule is codified in the zoning enabling statutes of many states and
is otherwise recognised in municipal zoning ordinances with few
exceptions.3 Although protection of existing nonconforming uses has
been a part of zoning practice in most jurisdictions since its inception, it
has always enjoyed an uneasy status. Scholarly commentators often
express a begrudging attitude toward existing use protection treating it
as, at best, a necessary concession to the political power of incumbent
property owners or a pragmatic compromise to avoid legal controversy.4
1. A compromise is to require all to comply but to compensate those who have relied
on the old rule.
2. See JULIAN CONRAD JUERGENSMEYER ET AL., LAND USE PLANNING AND
DEVELOPMENT REGULATION LAW § 4.31 (3d ed. 2021).
3. Id. § 4.31 n.8 (citing N.H. STAT. ANN. § 674:19 (1983); N.J. STAT. ANN. 40:55D-68
(1985); OR. REV. STAT. § 215.130 (5) (1999)); Kenneth R. Kupchak et al., Arrow of Time:
Vested Rights, Zoning Estoppel, and Development Agreements in Hawai’i, 27 U. HAW. L.
REV. 17, 21 (2004).
4. E.g., NORMAN WILLIAMS, JR. & JOHN M. TAYLOR, 6 AMERICAN LAND PLANNING
LAW § 117 (rev. ed. 2020) (“With all the other problems in the early days of zoning, no one
was particularly anxious to take on this kind of headache. If a policy were proposed to
drastically limit such uses, the political difficulties of getting any zoning law passed would
obviously be vastly increased; and no one knew how the courts would react.”); DANIEL R.
MANDELKER & MICHAEL ALLAN WOLF, LAND USE LAW § 5.74 (6th ed., LexisNexis
Matthew Bender 2020) (“The nonconforming use is a difficult problem in zoning
administration. The mixed land use pattern that exists in built-up cities means that some uses
will not conform to newly adopted or amended zoning ordinances. A zoning ordinance cannot
achieve its goal of separating incompatible uses in this situation unless it requires the
elimination of nonconforming uses.”); Richard Babcock, What Should and Can be Done with
Nonconforming Uses, Lecture Before the Institute on Planning, Zoning and Eminent Domain
at the Southwestern Legal Foundation (Oct. 21-22, 1971), in PROCEEDINGS OF THE INSTITUTE
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Despite the ubiquity of existing use protection,5 the underlying rationale
for the existing use exemption is rarely explored, let alone systematically
defended.6
In the most systematic recent discussion of existing use protection,
Christopher Serkin has argued that special protection for existing uses is
not required by constitutional doctrine and is unwise as a matter of
policy.7 He argues that there is no policy rationale for treating zoning
regulations that prohibit existing uses categorically differently from
zoning regulations that rule out options for future uses.8 Serkin also
contends that existing uses are not entitled to any sort of blanket
protection undertakings due process doctrine and should be subject to
the same constitutional analysis as purely prospective uses.9
This Article will answer Serkin’s challenge to the doctrine of
existing uses and show that treating past and future land use choices
asymmetrically is usually justified. Far from being a blot on otherwise
orderly zoning regulation, protection of existing uses follows from both
the original logic of zoning regulation as a planning instrument and the
more recent model of creating zoning rules through a series of one-off
agreements with developers. In the former case, existing use protection
mitigates the unfairness of subjecting similarly situated landowners to
starkly different rules. In the latter case, protecting existing uses by
statute improves the bargaining position of local governments and
prevents them from reneging on agreements with developers after
reliance on the rezoning.
Under both models of zoning regulation, existing use protection
vindicates values that are central to the normative function of property
rights.10 First, the protection of existing uses appropriately reflects the
difference in the value of continuing ongoing projects and preserving
options for future projects. Part of the normative function of property
ON PLANNING, ZONING, AND EMINENT DOMAIN 23, 25-26 (Sw. Legal Found. ed. 1972)
(discussing early attitudes toward existing uses).
5. For example, in Somerville, MA, which has a population of over 80,000, there are
only twenty-two residential buildings that comply with the city’s zoning code. Daniel Hertz,
The illegal city of Somerville, CITY OBSERVATORY (June 15, 2016),
https://cityobservatory.org/the-illegal-city-of-somerville/. The rest would be illegal to build
today without a zoning variance and only persists because existing nonconforming uses are
protected.
6. See Christopher Serkin, Existing Uses and the Limits of Land Use Regulations, 84
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1222, 1224 (2009).
7. Id. at 1222.
8. Id. at 1230.
9. See id. at 1281.
10. See Jeremy Waldron, Property and Ownership, STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
PHILOSOPHY
(Sept.
6,
2004
revised
March
21,
2020),
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/property/#JustLibeCons.
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ownership is the ability to develop one’s plans without outside
interference. Private property provides individuals with a sphere in
which they can exercise exclusive control and carry out their plans and
projects over time. From this point of view, frustration of an ongoing
project is a different sort of harm than elimination of a future option.
Protection of existing uses allows property owners to begin new projects
with confidence that these projects will not be disrupted by most new
land use regulations. Distinguishing between an owner’s interest in
pursuing ongoing projects and her interest in freedom to choose between
various options provides a principled reason to prohibit certain future,
but not existing, uses of land under some circumstances.
Whereas under the pre-zoning regime, each landowner was given
broad discretion to do what they want on their property, the post-zoning
legal regime shifts decisional authority over land use away from property
owners but leaves the option of securing a right to engage in activities
by purchasing property on which such activity is legal.11 For example,
insofar as I may not convert my home into a small restaurant because it
is zoned exclusively for residential use, my options as a landowner are
restricted. But the existence of an active market in real estate allows me
to sell my home and purchase a building zoned appropriately for a
restaurant, or, better yet, an existing restaurant. Existing use protection
gives property owners security that so long as their land use activities
comply with regulations in force at the time they begin, they will be
allowed to continue even if regulations change.12 Property owners,
therefore, retain much of their prior freedom to choose between
activities. The difference is that under zoning regimes, this freedom of
choice is mediated by real estate markets that allow buyers to select
properties on which their proposed activities are legally permissible.
Zoning regulation in the context of a robust real estate market and a
zoning code that permits every legal activity on at least some land
preserves property owners’ freedom of choice, albeit with significantly
higher transaction costs given the expense of buying and selling real
estate.
Second, zoning regulations, properly understood, are primarily a
tool to prevent neighboring property owners from developing
inconsistent plans rather than to regulate existing conflicts.13 Using
11. Robert C. Ellickson, Alternatives to Zoning: Covenants, Nuisance Rules, and Fines
as Land Use Controls, 40 U. CHI. L. REV. 681, 691-93 (1973).
12. Nonconforming Uses, Structures, and Lots, MRSC, http://mrsc.org/Home/ExploreTopics/Planning/Development-Regulations/Nonconforming-Uses-Structures-and-LotsRegulatio.aspx (last updated Apr. 2, 2021) (discussing Rhod-A-Zalea v. Snohomish, 136
Wn.2d 1, 7 (1998)).
13. WILLIAMS, JR. & TAYLOR, supra note 4, § 17.7.
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zoning codes to outlaw existing uses undermines the function of property
rights of dividing spheres of authority. Property rules codify a norm of
the following sort: “I respect my neighbor’s decisions with respect to her
property, and she respects my decisions with respect to mine.”
Aggressive use of zoning law to countermand an owner’s lawful land
use choices upsets this equilibrium between neighbors and unsettles the
allocation of decisional authority that property rules are meant to fix.
This has several bad effects. Prohibition of existing land uses has a
strong tendency to transfer wealth from one property owner to another.14
By contrast, existing use protection prevents landowners from using
zoning law to avoid other means of resolving existing land use disputes
with their neighbors (private bargaining, nuisance law, etc.) that may be
better suited for situations with current (as opposed to merely potential
future) land use conflicts.15
Third, existing use protection reflects appropriate skepticism about
the value of strict separation of uses for those uses that are not so harmful
that they can plausibly be considered nuisances. The ability of local
governments to prohibit land uses that burden neighbors to such an
extent that they constitute nuisances means that the most problematic
uses do not qualify for protection.
In light of these considerations, it is undesirable to abolish statutory
protection of nonconforming uses and resolve conflicts between owners
of nonconformities and zoning authorities at the level of constitutional
law. The murky nature of takings and due process jurisprudence
combined with the factual complexity of zoning cases is likely to
generate a great deal of legal uncertainty in the absence of statutory
protection for existing uses. Resolving hard cases involving existing
uses through constitutional doctrine also may have a deleterious effect
on the law as judges feel torn between a desire to protect property owners
who have made important decisions in reliance on prior zoning law and
the impulse to take a deferential approach to factually complex policy
choices made by local governments. Given common intuitions that
existing uses have a special status, there is some danger that adjudicating
such cases under the takings clause might expand protection for
regulatory takings in ways undesirable for other types of police power
regulation.
Part I will provide an overview of the treatment of existing uses in
zoning law and a brief account of the case against existing use protection.
Part II will discuss two models of land use regulation: planning and
14. Ellickson, supra note 11 at 699; see infra Part III.B.
15. See generally Ellickson, supra note 11.
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contract, and will show how protection of existing uses is consistent with
each model. Part III explores the value of property ownership and how
existing use protection plays a vital role in preserving a domain in which
landowners can rely upon their land use choices being respected in the
future at the same time as local governments are allowed scope for fairly
extensive land use regulation. Part IV considers existing use protection
in the context of theoretical work on “legal transitions” and shows how
the literature on the advantages of disadvantages of various approaches
to legal transitions supports the conclusion that grandfathering is the best
response to non-conforming uses. Part V argues that judicial resolution
of the existing use issues on constitutional grounds is undesirable.
Courts tend to defer to local governments when faced with due process
claims about land use cases and thus will not adequately protect owners
of non-conforming properties. Takings claims in defense of nonconforming properties provide greater scope for relief, but subject
property owners and local governments to a highly uncertain legal
regime that will, at best, provide occasional and mostly inadequate
compensation for landowners.
II. EXISTING USE PROTECTION IN ZONING LAW
A. Nonconforming Uses and Vested Rights
A nonconforming use is “a use of land, building or premises that
lawfully existed prior to the enactment of a zoning ordinance and that is
maintained after the effective date of such ordinance, even though it does
not comply with the use restrictions applicable to the area in which it is
situated.”16 For example, a factory producing cement is an existing use,
whereas an empty parcel owned by a cement company that intends to
build a cement factory at some point in the future but has taken no steps
to do so is not an existing use. The rule in almost all U.S. jurisdictions
is that existing uses are exempted from subsequent changes in zoning
law unless they constitute a nuisance.17 The cement factory, for

16. PATRICK J. ROHAN & ERIC DAMIAN KELLY, ZONING AND LAND USE CONTROLS §
41.01[1] (LexisNexis Matthew Bender 2021); see also, e.g., Melody v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals
of Glastonbury, 264 A.2d 572, 574 (Conn. 1969) (“A nonconforming use is merely an
‘existing use’ the continuance of which is authorized by the zoning regulations.”).
17. See MANDELKER & WOLF, supra note 4, § 5.74 (“The courts now hold that a
municipality may not zone retroactively to terminate a nonconforming use, some state zoning
statutes impose this limitation.”); JUERGENSMEYER ET AL., supra note 2, § 4.31 (“Even where
not mandated by state law, zoning ordinances almost universally permit nonconforming uses
to continue. Where not so allowed, some courts have held retroactive application invalid as
having no substantial relation to the public health, safety and welfare, or as not authorized by
enabling acts.”)
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example, would be permitted to continue operation even if the zoning
designation of the land on which it stands was changed to residential.
Such a zoning change, by contrast, would quash any attempt to purchase
a vacant lot and build a factory on it. The prevailing view is that courts
will not uphold zoning laws that require immediate termination of an
existing use absent some special circumstance such as where the existing
use constitutes a nuisance.18 For the most part, zoning codes stipulate
the zoning regulations are to be applied only prospectively so as not to
inference with existing land uses. As a result, although zoning law
aspires to separate conflicting land uses, it functions primarily to prevent
the future development of such conflicts rather than to mediate already
existing conflicts.
Nonconforming uses should not be confused with exemptions from
an otherwise applicable zoning regulation made after the enactment of
the regulation, such as variances, special permits and conditional uses.19
Nonconforming uses, by contrast with all of these, pre-exist the
regulation that proscribes them. A property may be nonconforming in
one of several ways. It may be a nonconforming lot, have a
nonconforming structure, host a nonconforming activity, or some
combination of these.20 Unless otherwise indicated, I will follow
customary usage by referring to any of these nonconformities as
nonconforming uses. This Article will be primarily concerned, however,
with existing uses in the narrow sense: that which refers to activities
rather than structures or lots. However, many of the same arguments
also apply to non-conforming lots and non-conforming structures
particularly because the viability of certain activities may depend on the
permissibility of continued use of a non-conforming lot or structure.
Existing uses and structures are usually grandfathered into the new
regulatory regime for at least a significant amortization period and often
in perpetuity.21
Although the source of constitutional protection for nonconforming
uses is somewhat unclear, courts have long suggested that termination
of existing uses raises special concerns.22 Some decisions suggest that
18. E.g., MANDELKER & WOLF, supra note 4, § 2.04 (“Courts today will not uphold a
zoning ordinance that immediately terminates an existing, otherwise legal, nonconforming
use . . . . They continue to uphold ordinances that terminate public nuisances.”).
19. ROHAN & KELLY, supra note 16, § 41.01[1].
20. See Ellickson, supra note 11.
21. See e.g., Christopher Serkin, Existing Uses and the Limits of Land Use Regulations,
84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1222, 1232 (2009).
22. See, e.g., Bettendorf v. St. Croix Cty., 631 F.3d 421, 432-34 (7th Cir. 2011)
(Hamilton, J., dissenting) (explaining that Wisconsin law protects owners of non-conforming
uses whose rights have vested).
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protection of existing users is required to protect an owner’s due process
rights.23 Others find the primary source of protection for existing uses
to be the takings clause.24 Either theory is premised on the notion that
existing uses are entitled to stronger property rights protections than the
analogous right to use one’s hitherto undeveloped property for the same
purpose in the future. In Penn Central Transp. Co. v. City of New York,
for example, the Court explicitly noted that the new historical landmark
regulation did not interfere with the owner’s longstanding existing use
of the property and contrasted this with cases in which regulations
prohibited the present use of a property.25 The Court has refined
regulatory takings doctrine in a number of respects since Penn Central,
but the principle that restricting a previously permissible use of property
may constitute a taking is well settled.26
In many states, the zoning enabling act provides that zoning codes
must not be applied to existing uses.27 Even when not required by a
state’s zoning enabling act, most municipal zoning codes treat
nonconformities as having a special status.28 A few zoning codes do
require outright termination of non-conforming uses within a short
period of time. However, these are usually limited to “the termination
of nonconforming uses of open land, of nonconforming signs, of
nonconforming open storage uses such as junkyards and lumberyards,
and or other nonconforming uses involving relatively small
investments.”29 Because existing uses are usually exempted from
subsequent zoning regulations, legal disputes usually center not on
23. McMilian v. King Cty., 255 P.3d 739, 749 (Wash. Ct. App. 2011) (citing State ex
rel. Miller v. Cain, 40 Wash. 2d 216, 218, 242 P.2d 505 (1952)) (“[T]he purpose underlying
the continuance of nonconforming uses . . . is to avoid potential constitutional due process
challenges to zoning legislation arising from deprivations of property rights . . . .”); Nettleton
v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment of City of Pittsburgh, 828 A.2d 1033, 1036 (Pa. 2003) (“This
Court has said that the protection evolved as a conceived element of due process.”) (citing
Molnar v. George B. Henne & Co., 105 A.2d 325, 329-30 (Pa. 1954)).
24. Mo. Rock, Inc. v. Winholtz, 614 S.W.2d 734, 739 (Mo. Ct. App. 1981) (citing State
ex rel. Nealy v. Cole, 442 S.W.2d 128, 131 (Mo. Ct. App. 1969) (“Zoning ordinances must
permit continuation of non-conforming uses in existence at the time of enactment to avoid
violation of constitutional provisions preventing the taking of private property without
compensation.”).
25. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 136 (1978) (“Its
designation as a landmark not only permits but contemplates that appellants may continue to
use the property precisely as it has been used for the past 65 years: as a railroad terminal
containing office space and concessions. So the law does not interfere with what must be
regarded as Penn Central’s primary expectation concerning the use of the parcel.”).
26. Bettendorf, 631 F.3d at 433-34 (Hamilton, J., dissenting).
27. See JUERGENSMEYER ET AL., supra note 2, § 4.31 n.8 (citing N.H. Stat. Ann. § 674:19
(1983); N.J. Stat. Ann. 40:55D-68 (1985); Or. Rev. Stat. § 215.130 (5) (1999)).
28. See Kupchak et al., supra note 3, at 21.
29. WILLIAMS, JR. & TAYLOR, supra note 4, § 124.8.
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whether non-conforming uses may be prohibited under new zoning
regulations, but rather over whether a use was legal prior to the
enactment of the regulation,30 whether such uses can be eliminated after
a period of amortization,31 whether the use was abandoned by the
owner,32 whether a change from one nonconforming use to another is
permissible,33 whether a change made by an owner is a permissible
continuation of an existing use or an impermissible expansion of that
use,34 whether a new use is a permissible accessory to a legally
permissible nonconforming use or a new principal use forbidden by
zoning regulations,35 whether an owner may transfer the right to continue
to non-conforming use to a subsequent owner,36 or whether a nonconforming structure may be rebuilt after a fire or similar incident.37
30. See, e.g., Eggert v. Bd. of Appeals of the City of Chicago, 195 N.E.2d 164 (Ill. 1964)
(considering whether the seven-apartment building was in violation of the zoning ordinance);
Bd. of Zoning Appeals v. Leisz, 702 N.E.2d 1026 (Ind. 1998) (centering on zoning ordinance
that limited the number of unrelated adults that could live together to three); Balough v.
Fairbanks N. Star Borough, 995 P.2d 245 (Alaska 2000) (involving a junkyard owner seeking
nonconforming use status following a rezoning); Relihan v. Woodbridge Zoning Bd. of
Appeals, 2010 Conn. Super. LEXIS 545 (Conn. Super. Ct. 2010) (involving a landscaping
business on property that was later re-zoned and prohibited); Rollison v. City of Key W., 875
So. 2d 659 (Fla. App. 2004) (involving property that was lawfully used as a short-term rental
before the city changed the zoning laws); Gavlak v. Town of Somers, 267 F. Supp. 2d 214 (D.
Conn. 2003) (involving a dispute over whether the operation of a water business was within
the zoning regulations); First Pioneer Trading Co. v. Pierce Cty., 191 P.3d 928 (Wash. App.
2008) (considering whether a steel fabrication business could establish a legal nonconforming
use of the property).
31. Art Neon Co. v. City & Cty. of Denver, 488 F.2d 118 (10th Cir. 1973); Cioppa v.
Apostol, 755 N.Y.S.2d 458 (N.Y. App. Div. 2003).
32. See, e.g., Dorman v. Mayor & City Council of Balt., 51 A.2d 658 (Md. 1947); Vill.
of Plainfield v. Am. Cedar Designs, Inc., 775 N.E. 2d 1002 (Ill. App. 2000); Pike Indus., Inc.
v. Woodward, 999 A.2d 257 (N.H. 2010); Heichel v. Springfield Twp. Zoning Hearing Bd.,
830 A.2d 1081 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2003).
33. See, e.g., Bd. of Zoning Appeals v. McCalley, 300 S.E.2d 790 (Va. 1983).
34. See, e.g., State ex rel. Dierberg v. Bd. of Zoning Adjustment, 869 S.W.2d 865 (Mo.
Ct. App. 1994); San Remo Hotel v. City & Cty. of San Francisco, 41 P.3d 87 (Cal. 2002)
(holding that conversion of building from mix of long-term residential and tourist short-term
rental to entirely short-term tourist rentals was a change or expansion of existing use that
required owner to secure a conditional use permit); Nettleton v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment of
City of Pittsburgh, 828 A.2d 1033 (Pa. 2003) (permitting expansion of a non-conforming
structure from one story to three stories on the grounds that the nonconforming commercial
use would remain the same); Munroe v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals of Branford, 818 A.2d 72
(Conn. App. Ct. 2003) (holding that addition on second story on non-conforming garage was
impermissible expansion of nonconformity); Cleveland MHC, LLC v. City of Richland, 163
So. 3d 284 (Miss. 2015) (holding that existing nonconforming use status applies to a mobile
home park as a whole and that replacement of one mobile home with another on a lot in the
park is a continuation of this non-conforming use and does not terminate it).
35. See, e.g., City of Okoboji v. Okoboji Barz, Inc., 746 N.W.2d 56 (Iowa 2008) (holding
that a restaurant owner was not barred from selling alcohol by the zoning ordinance).
36. See, e.g., Vill. of Valatie v. Smith, 632 N.E.2d 1264 (N.Y. 1994).
37. Buss v. Johnson, 624 N.W.2d 781 (Minn. Ct. App. 2001); Goyonaga v. Bd. of Zoning
Appeals, 657 S.E.2d 153 (Va. 2008) (holding that demolition of nonconforming structure due
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Nonconforming use privileges generally run with the land. Owners
are typically permitted to transfer ownership of their property without
losing the right to continue a nonconforming use.38 Unless subject to
amortization, nonconforming uses usually may be continued
indefinitely, but not expanded or changed substantially in character.39
Governments may impose various limitations on nonconformities,
including limitations on changes in use, enlargement, alteration of
structures, and repairs and replacement of structures.40 Some zoning
codes allow property owners to shift from one nonconforming use to
another, provided the second is less burdensome than the first.41 Owners
of non-conforming properties are typically permitted to make ordinary
repairs need to keep the property in a condition similar to that it was in
when it became nonconforming.42 However, it is usually permissible for
a local government to terminate the right to continue a non-conforming
use if the property is destroyed by fire or natural disaster.43
The scope of protection of existing uses is generally determined by
the nature of the activity. Thus, expansion of a nonconforming
convenience store to occupy a greater proportion of the owner’s lot may
be prevented without injury to the owner’s rights, a non-conforming
surface mine may be permitted to expand across the owner’s lot under
the “diminishing asset doctrine, which permits expansion of nonconforming extractive activities to new portions of the same property
owned by the owner at the time of the enactment of the regulation.”44
The activity of operating a convenience store does not require expansion
to new territory, whereas exploiting exhaustible resources requires, by
its very nature, the use of new land.45 The scope of existing use
to unforeseen difficulties in construction of addition terminates nonconforming use privileges
such that City may forbid construction of new home with same footprint as demolished home).
38. See, e.g., Town of Lyons v. Bashor, 867 P.2d 159 (Colo. App. 1993) (nonconforming
use runs with the land); Budget Inn of Daphne, Inc. v. City of Daphne, 789 So. 2d 154 (Ala.
2000) (holding that statute, which terminates nonconforming use protection of sign upon
transfer of ownership, is unconstitutional taking without compensation). Cf. Palazzolo v.
Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606 (2001) (holding that a transferee who acquired title to a property
after the enactment of the regulation in question may bring a takings claim).
39. See, e.g., State ex rel. Dauphin Stor-All, Inc. v. City of Mobile, 503 So. 2d 1224 (Ala.
1987) (holding that because the business of an automobile-parts wholesaler was not
substantially the same kind of business as a bakery, the tenant’s loss of “legal-nonconforming”
status was appropriate, regardless of the relative intensity of the use of the property).
40. ROHAN & KELLY, supra note 16, § 41.03[1].
41. Id. § 41.03[2][b].
42. See id. § 41.03[3][a].
43. See, e.g., Baird v. Bradley, 240 P.2d 1016, 1017 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1952).
44. See Hansen Bros. Enters., Inc. v. Bd. of Supervisors, 907 P.2d 1324, 1328 (Cal.
1996).
45. Pennsylvania, however, permits the expansion of nonconforming stores and the like
under the theory that nonconforming uses have a right to “natural expansion.” See WILLIAMS,
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protection, therefore, extends beyond protection of physical structures
but to particular sorts of economic activity—in some cases even when
the activity requires expansion that may be more burdensome to
neighbors.
Although flat prohibition of existing uses is rare, some local
governments require that certain nonconforming uses be discontinued
after an “amortization” period that allows a property owner to recoup
their investment in the property. Amortization is permissible in most
states but forbidden in others.46 Amortization is intended to enable
regulations that otherwise would qualify as takings by permitting owners
to realize much of their “investment backed expectations” and give them
fair warning that future investments in their nonconforming use will not
be legally protected.47 The permissible length of amortization period is
the crux of much litigation.48 The general rule is that the greater the
investment in the nonconforming use, the longer the amortization period
required.49 A few states prohibit amortization schemes altogether either
by statute50 or as a matter of state constitutional law.51
A long-standing exception to the principle that zoning regulations
ought to respect existing uses is that local governments retain the right
to terminate nonconforming nuisances without compensation.52 The
JR. & TAYLOR, supra note 4, § 121.11. This leads Pennsylvania courts to sanction changes of
nonconforming uses that might be prohibited in other states. E.g., Nettleton v. Zoning Bd. of
Adjustment of City of Pittsburgh, 828 A.2d 1033, 1033 (Pa. 2003) (allowing expansion of
building housing nonconforming commercial use from one story to three stories); see Smalley
v. Zoning Hearing Bd., 834 A.2d 535, 544 (Pa. 2003) (holding that town failed to present
evidence that expansion of plaintiff’s tax accounting practice operated out of his home was
anything other than “natural expansion” of his business).
46. WILLIAMS, JR. & TAYLOR, supra note 4, § 124 (rev. ed. 2020); Osborne M. Reynolds
Jr., The Reasonableness of Amortization Periods for Nonconforming Uses—Balancing the
Private Interest and the Public Welfare, 34 WASH. U. J. URB. & CONTEMP. L. 99, 107 (1988);
ROBERT C. ELLICKSON & VICKI L. BEEN, LAND USE CONTROLS 199-200 (3d. ed. 2005).
47. Serkin, supra note 6, at 1236, 1250.
48. See, e.g., Cioppa v. Apostol, 755 N.Y.S.2d 458, 458 (N.Y. App. Div. 2003)
(remanding case involving nonconforming tavern found to be a public nuisance so that owner
could provide evidence concerning reasonableness of thirty day amortization period).
49. See, e.g., Town of Islip v. Caviglia, 540 N.E.2d 215, 224 (N.Y. 1989).
50. MINN. STAT. § 394.21 subd. 1a (2011); COLO. REV. STAT. 38-1-101(3)(a) (2006);
VA. CODE ANN. § 15.2-2307 (2017); WIS. STAT. § 59.69(10)(e)(2) (2020).
51. E.g., PA Nw. Distrib., Inc. v. Zoning Hearing Bd., 584 A.2d 1372 (Pa. 1991); Lamar
Advert. of S. Ga., Inc. v. City of Albany, 389 S.E.2d 216 (Ga. 1990); Hoffmann v. Kinealy,
389 S.W.2d 745 (Mo. 1965); see ELLICKSON & BEEN, supra note 46, at 200-01.
52. Brown v. Grant, 2 S.W.2d 285, 287 (Tex. Civ. App. 1928) (“No one gainsays that a
municipal government within its police power has the right to prescribe rules regulating the
character of buildings to be erected and the material to be used within certain prescribed
boundaries, and also requiring permits to be first obtained before entering on their
construction. But such ordinances must be and [sic] relate to the future. Of course, that does
not prevent cities from moving to abate nuisances whenever occurring.”); Jones v. City of Los
Angeles, 295 P. 14, 17 (Cal. 1930); Comment, Retroactive Zoning Ordinances, 39 YALE L.J.
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underlying notion is that since there is no right under common law to
create or operate a nuisance, a local government may use zoning law to
accomplish what could be legally done by other means.53 In practice,
this means that uses that pose a threat to the health, safety, or peace of
the community are not necessarily protected from subsequent zoning
regulation, whereas zoning regulation enacted for aesthetic or more
inchoate economic purposes cannot be used to eliminate existing uses.54
Nonconforming uses are likewise vulnerable to ordinary (i.e., nonzoning) police power regulation. A local government may enact
regulations that have the effect of making an existing use impossible or
impractical if such regulations are reasonably related to the health,

735, 739 (1930) (“A restriction imposed to prohibit an offensive use is not a taking of property
for which compensation must be made and in the abatement of nuisances retroactive measures
are valid.”); J. P. Chamberlain & Sterling Pierson, Current Legislation: Zoning Laws and
Ordinances, 10 A.B.A. J. 185, 185 (1924) (“Zoning looks to the future, not the past, and it is
customary to allow buildings and businesses already in the district to remain, although of a
class which cannot be established. If such a business constitutes a nuisance it can still be
removed under the police power, but the zoning acts in themselves do not customarily
interfere with existing conditions.”).
53. Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1029-30 (1992) (noting that the status
of a prohibited activity as a common law nuisance is a defense against regulatory takings
claims).
54. E.g., Conrad v. City of Beebe, 388 S.W.3d 465, 469 (Ark. Ct. App. 2012) (holding
that keeping of non-domestic animals and non-operating vehicles did not qualify as a
nonconforming use because the regulation prohibiting it was enacted in response to “an
imminent threat to the public peace, health, safety, and welfare.”); City of Fayetteville v. S.
& H. Inc., 547 S.W.2d 94, 98 (1977) (“When our prior decisions are considered in connection
with the City’s finding that the existence of signs throughout the City were detrimental to its
scenic resources and therefore to its economic base, we must conclude that the seven year
provisions of the ordinance amortizing non-conforming onsite signs used in connection with
a going business, that are not inimical to the health, safety or morals of the City, amounts to a
taking of the appellees’ properties without just compensation therefor in violation of Art. 2 §
22, supra. However, the prohibition against flashing or blinking signs falls within that area of
police regulation that is exercised for the protection of the health and morals of the people.”);
Williams v. Dep’t of Bldg. Dev. Servs., 192 S.W.3d 545, 546 (Mo. App. S.D. 2006)
(permitting termination of non-conforming salvage yard on grounds that it is a nuisance);
David M. Roberts, Zoning—Abatement of Prior Nonconforming Uses: Nuisance Regulations
and Amortization Provisions, 31 MO. L. REV. 280, 289 (1966) (“Most courts probably are not
willing to attach the nuisance label to a nonconforming use unless its deleterious effects are
fairly clear and substantial. Nuisance has always been associated with uses which cause
relatively concrete harm to the enjoyment of surrounding property. In the cases applying an
expanded concept of nuisance the damage which the offending uses threatened was much
more serious than most zoning regulations are intended to cure.”); Dix W. Noel, Retroactive
Zoning and Nuisances, 41 COLUM. L. REV. 457, 473 (1941) (“If only an aesthetic annoyance
is involved, a retroactive prohibition is unlikely to be sustained, although in an extreme case,
such as that of a large gas container or mausoleum in a residential area, mere unsightliness
might be found sufficiently detrimental to warrant removal. If harm of a more tangible
character is involved, such as that caused by noise, odor, soot or smoke, the likelihood that
retroactive restrictions will be sustained is much greater . . . .”).
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safety, and welfare of the community55 as long as such regulations do
not preclude any valuable use of the property56 or constitute a physical
invasion of the property.57 In many cases, therefore, a nonconforming
use is protected from a local government’s zoning regulations, but may
be eliminated by the enactment of some other regulation by the same
governmental entity.58 A crucial difference between these forms of
regulation is that zoning regulations are, by design, non-uniform across
different zones and may cover only a few properties, whereas other
police power regulations are applicable to the jurisdiction as a whole.
Because of the significant value of existing use protection, many
nonconforming use cases turn on whether a property owner has obtained
a “vested right” to a particular use prior to the enactment of a new
regulation. In order to obtain a vested right in an existing use, a property
owner must do more than form a mere plan or bare expectation, but
usually something far less than actual commencement of the use
ultimately contemplated suffices for vesting.59 A typical fact pattern
involves a developer who has acquired land and made some investment
toward developing it for a particular purpose that was legal when the
investment was made. Whether the developer acquires a vested right to
continue to develop in the face of subsequent zoning regulations depends
on the precise extent of the developer’s progress. Courts must balance
the significant investments that have typically been made before
construction begins with concern that granting vested rights at too early
a stage encourages developers to rush projects to pre-empt public
scrutiny.60
55. Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590, 592 (1962) (“Concededly the
ordinance completely prohibits a beneficial use to which the property has previously been
devoted. However, such a characterization does not tell us whether or not the ordinance is
unconstitutional. It is an oft-repeated truism that every regulation necessarily speaks as a
prohibition. If this ordinance is otherwise a valid exercise of the town’s police powers, the
fact that it deprives the property of its most beneficial use does not render it
unconstitutional.”).
56. See Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1003-04 (1992).
57. See Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 419 (1982).
58. See Rhod-A-Zalea & 35th, Inc. v. Snohomish Cty., 959 P.2d 1024, 1024 (Wash.
1998) (holding that although a peat mine was protected under zoning laws as an existing
nonconforming use, the County could require the mine owner to obtain a “grading permit” in
order to continue operations); see Star Nw. Inc. v. City of Kenmore, 280 Fed. Appx. 654, 654
(9th Cir. 2008) (holding that the City of Kenmore’s prohibition of card rooms applied to card
rooms operating at the time of the enactment of the ordinance despite statutory protection for
existing uses in Kenmore’s zoning code).
59. See WILLIAMS, JR. & TAYLOR, supra note 4, § 119:2.
60. MANDELKER & WOLF, supra note 4, § 6.11 (“The law of vested rights and estoppel
must strike a fine balance between the competing interests of the developer and the
municipality. A developer needs some protection from changes in land use requirements that
prevent it from completing the project or that make completion more expensive.
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B. The Anomaly of Existing Use Protection
Protection of nonconforming uses appears well entrenched and,
with the exception of various amortization schemes, has been little
threatened over the past half-century. Although nonconforming use
protection is a fundamental aspect of American land use law, its
justification is not obvious. In this section, I will explore the case against
existing use protection. Criticism of the prevalence of nonconforming
uses is not a new phenomenon.61 Early advocates of zoning often
favored the application of zoning codes to both existing as well as new
uses and structures.62 Although some early zoning codes did not
grandfather existing uses, existing use protection was already customary
by the mid-1920’s.63 Juergensmeyer and Roberts suggest four reasons
for this change. First, zoning was regarded as a tool to influence future
development rather than regulate prior development.64 Second, it does
not seem that the presence of “a few nonconforming uses [are] totally
contrary to the public health, safety and welfare.”65
Third,
grandfathering existing uses reduced political opposition to zoning
regulations by exempting the parties most likely to lobby against the new
regulation.66 Fourth, although courts sometimes showed a willingness
to permit the termination of existing uses,67 grandfathering existing uses
removed a significant legal vulnerability.68 In some instances, courts
explicitly refused to enforce zoning provisions that did not grandfather
existing uses.69 William Fischel points to a fifth factor, namely that
popular sentiment often ran in favor of owners of properties that did not
conform to new zoning codes and against local governments that
targeted existing uses.70 This, he claims, tipped the balance in favor of
Municipalities need the freedom to revise their land use requirements to meet new land use
problems or to implement new land use policies.”)
61. Complaints about the persistence of non-conforming uses are almost as old as
American zoning law. WILLIAM A. FISCHEL, ZONING RULES! 186 (2015).
62. See id.
63. See Chamberlain & Pierson, supra note 52, at 185 (“Zoning looks to the future, not
the past, and it is customary to allow buildings and businesses already in the district to remain,
although of a class which cannot be established. If such a business constitutes a nuisance it
can still be removed under the police power, but the zoning acts in themselves do not
customarily interfere with existing conditions.”).
64. JUERGENSMEYER ET AL., supra note 2, § 4.31.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. See, e.g., Hadacheck v. Sebastin, 239 U.S. 394, 414 (1915).
68. JUERGENSMEYER ET AL., supra note 2, at § 4.31.
69. E.g., W. Theological Seminary v. City of Evanston, 156 N.E. 778, 784-85 (Ill. 1927)
(holding that zoning regulations may not be applied to existing uses); see JUERGENSMEYER
ET AL., supra note 2, § 4.31.
70. See FISCHEL, supra note 61, at 192.
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existing uses despite skepticism from planning experts and acquiescence
by many courts.71
Zoning experts, however, continue to be ambivalent about nonconformities.72 A leading scholar of land use law noted in the 1950’s
that the tenacity of nonconforming uses despite expectations that they
would fade away over time has been “one of the great disappointments
of the zoning movement.”73 Christopher Serkin is only the latest of
many commentators to propose more vigorous measures against nonconformities.74 In addition to more aggressive use of amortization
provisions, Serkin countenances immediate termination as well.75
The most fundamental objection to existing use protection is
straightforward: it seems to impose a sharp and arbitrary distinction
between the rights of similarly situated owners. This seems problematic
for four reasons. First, existing use protection may appear to benefit
owners of non-conforming properties unfairly at the expense of
neighbors who are burdened not only by the persistence of the nonconforming use, but also by the restrictions imposed by the new zoning
code.76 Protection of non-conformities entrenches current uses even as
it prohibits precisely analogous future uses.77
If Al owns a
nonconforming property, a junkyard, for example, he may perpetuate
this nonconforming use indefinitely regardless of the burden on his
neighbors. His neighbor Ben, however, may not operate a junkyard
regardless of the relative value of junkyards on Al’s and Ben’s properties
and the relative burdens on their neighbors. Ben may not operate a
junkyard even if his land is next to Al’s and Al’s junkyard compromises
71. Id. (“This seems to be a case in which the leaders of zoning called for a practice that
the public was unwilling to accept, even though the courts either endorsed the practice or
tolerated it.”).
72. E.g., Babcock, supra note 4, at 25 (“The landowner’s expectation that he will be able
to build a factory on his vacant land is not fundamentally different from his expectation that
he can continue to operate his existing factory, and both expectations should be subject to the
same constitutional standards.”); C. McKim Norton, Elimination of Incompatible Uses and
Structures, 20 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 305, 305 (1955); Harland Bartholomew, NonConforming Uses Destroy the Neighborhood, 15 J. LAND & PUB. UTIL. ECON. 96, 96-97
(1939).
73. Daniel R. Mandelker, Prolonging the Nonconforming Use: Judicial Restriction of
the Power to Zone in Iowa, 8 DRAKE L. REV. 23, 23 (1958) [hereinafter Mandelker,
Prolonging the Nonconforming Use].
74. See generally Serkin, supra note 6; see also Osborne M. Reynolds Jr., The
Reasonableness of Amortization Periods for Nonconforming Uses – Balancing the Private
Interest and the Public Welfare, 34 J. OF URB. & CONTEMP. L. 99 (1988); see also Mandelker,
Prolonging the Nonconforming Use, supra, at 73.
75. See generally Serkin, supra note 6.
76. PATRICK J. ROHAN & ERIC DAMIAN KELLY, ZONING AND LAND USE CONTROLS §
41.01[1] (LexisNexis Matthew Bender 2021).
77. See id.
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Ben’s enjoyment of his land and reduces its market value. Existing use
protection thus seems like an arbitrary benefit for Al and a burden on
Ben that stems from an irrational distinction between past and future land
use choices. Indeed, grandfathering of existing uses under non-zoning
police power regulations sometimes invites judicial disapproval on the
grounds that such exemptions are presumptively unfair.78
Second, allowing nonconforming uses to persist undermines the
effectiveness of zoning law in separating conflicting uses.79 Requiring
that zoning regulations take effect only prospectively means that zoning
changes will have little immediate effect in developed areas.80 Serkin
notes that “[w]orking around existing uses can severely limit the efficacy
of zoning and other comprehensive land use planning, potentially
transforming prospective planning into a mere description and
codification of existing conditions.”81
Third, existing use protection gives landowners questionable
incentives.82 Rather than trying to anticipate whether a contemplated
land use will be consistent with the future development of the
neighborhood, existing use protection encourages speedy development
of potentially controversial uses so as to gain vested rights.83 Existing
use protection can thus lead to inefficient races between developers and
local governments in which the developer tries to develop a lot before a
property is rezoned so as to receive nonconforming use protection.84
Developers would have less incentive to race to secure vested rights if
local governments retained the right to apply subsequent zoning changes
to the property.85 Existing use protection likewise encourages property
owners to make excessive, socially inefficient investments in
burdensome uses, knowing that existing use protection will shield them
from reasonable, cost-justified land use regulations.86 If landowners
knew that burdensome uses risked triggering zoning changes, they
would be more careful to balance their own interests with those of
neighbors who might be adversely affected by new development.

78. See Katt v. Vill. of Sturtevant, 70 N.W.2d 188, 188-89 (Wis. 1955) (invalidating an
exemption for existing mink farms from a regulation prohibiting their operation); see
WILLIAMS, JR. & TAYLOR, supra note 4, § 117.5.
79. See Serkin, supra note 6, at 1225.
80. See id.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 1283.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. See Serkin, supra note 6, at 1283.
86. Id. at 1283-85.
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Finally, nonconforming use protection sometimes has the
unintended consequence of creating a local monopoly.87 For example, a
nonconforming store in a residential district has a local monopoly of
indefinite, and in principle perpetual, duration.88 This may have the
perverse effect of entrenching conforming uses that would otherwise be
uneconomical. It seems unfair to give owners of nonconforming
businesses a windfall for operating a business in a location deemed
inappropriate by the zoning code. Moreover, the prospect of a local
monopoly may encourage existing businesses to lobby for more
restrictive zoning so as to gain a competitive advantage.89
Serkin rebuts a number of common arguments for categorical
protection of existing uses. First, he notes that application of zoning
regulation to existing uses is only retroactive in the weak sense that is
considered unobjectionable in most other contexts.90 A new zoning
regulation does not make the existence of a nonconforming use illegal
prior to its enactment, but merely makes any future continuation of the
nonconformity illegal. To use terminology introduced by Stephen
Munzer, a law that is weakly prospective,91 such as a new health
regulation prohibiting use of a newly discovered carcinogen in
manufacturing, would sanction manufacturers only for future use of the
carcinogen. It would not, however, provide any safe harbor for
manufacturers who made costly investments in reliance on the old legal
regime in which the carcinogen could be used freely. By contrast, a
strongly prospective application of the regulation would exempt from
the force of the regulation equipment already in use, which could only
be operated using the carcinogen, but forbid the use of any subsequently
purchased equipment.92 Zoning regulations are typically strongly
prospective insofar as they apply only to new structures and new
activities and preserve the legal status of uses that reflect past decisions
made by landowners so long as such choices were legal at the time they
87. See id. at 1235 n.61.
88. E.g., Wickham v. Becker, 274 P. 397 (Cal. Ct. App. 1929) (invalidating zoning
regulation that prohibited commercial development everywhere in a jurisdiction except in two
small districts entirely occupied by existing businesses on grounds that this created local
monopoly prohibiting competition with existing businesses).
89. E.g., Lippow v. City of Miami Beach, 68 So. 2d 827 (Fla. 1953) (invalidating a
zoning change on the grounds there the government could articulate no rationale other than
protection of the economic interests of neighboring businesses); Charnofree Corp. v. City of
Miami Beach, 76 So. 2d 665 (Fla. 1954) (invalidating a zoning regulation on the grounds that
it had no discernible role in protecting the health, safety or morals of the community, but
appeared instead designed to protect existing businesses from new competition). See generally
James Dabney, Antitrust Aspects of Anticompetitive Zoning, 24 ANTITRUST BULL. 435 (1979).
90. Serkin, supra note 6, at 1262-65.
91. Stephen R. Munzer, Retroactive Law, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 373, 383 (1977).
92. See id. at 383.
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were made.93 Regulation of existing uses, Serkin claims, is not
inherently any more objectionable than all manner of other health,
safety, and environmental regulations that impose costs on regulated
parties as a result of choices made under the pre-existing legal regime.94
Abandoning existing use protection would make zoning law weakly
prospective rather than strongly prospective. Rather than reflecting a
general policy against retroactive legislation, existing use protection
represents a sort of grandfathering that is at least mildly atypical in
regulatory policy.
Second, Serkin argues that existing uses are not categorically
different from legal rights to build a structure or engage in an activity in
the future.95 According to Serkin, categorical protection of existing uses
reflects a sort of irrational preference for foregone losses as opposed to
out-of-pocket expenses.96 Prohibition of existing uses does not
necessarily impose greater losses on property owners than does the
prohibition of future uses.97 For example, downzoning a vacant lot in a
fast-growing urban area to prohibit any sort of dense development may
reduce the lot’s value by a huge percentage. If, on the other hand, the
lot contained a junkyard, changing zoning regulations to prohibit this use
might have virtually no effect on the lot’s market value. Application of
the latter, but not the former, zoning regulation might be blocked by the
status of the junkyard as an existing use.98 People may be prone to
overvalue out-of-pocket losses as compared with foregone future
gains.99 This sort of cognitive bias might explain why existing uses have
special status, but it does not justify it. Similarly, though an existing use
may be good evidence of the subjective expectations of a property
owner, it is not clear why these expectations should receive any more
protection than subjective expectations of future planned uses.100 In
most areas, the law is not especially solicitous of the latter sort of
expectations.101 More generally, appealing to subjective expectations in
this context is problematic. Since these expectations are shaped by the
fact that existing uses receive legal protection, appeal to such
93. Serkin, supra note 6, at 1224-25.
94. Id. at 1289.
95. See id. at 1268.
96. See id. at 1267.
97. Id. at 1267-68.
98. This result is not certain since it is conceivable that the junk yard could be regulated
as a nuisance.
99. See Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision
under Risk, 47 ECONOMETRICA 263, 263 (1979) (introducing prospect theory, which suggests
that people tend to value losses more than they value exactly equivalent gains).
100. Serkin, supra note 6, at 1275-77.
101. See id. at 1276-77.
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expectations to justify legal protection is circular. If existing uses were
not exempt from most zoning laws, landowners would revise their
expectations in light of the new legal rule.
Third, in response to those who argue that existing use protection is
necessary because of the vulnerability of property owners to abusive
regulation, Serkin argues that the interests of those who seek to protect
existing uses usually receive adequate consideration in ordinary
democratic political processes.102 Property owners who benefit from
existing use protection are readily identifiable, likely to have a
significant personal stake in the issue, and likely to be able to coordinate
with one another.103 By contrast, the beneficiaries of zoning changes are
usually more numerous, each have lower personal stakes in the outcome
and in many cases, are as yet unknown future owners of neighboring
properties.104 Basic principles of public choice theory suggest that
owners of non-conformities who have a significant individual stake in
zoning laws and know when they will be personally affected are likely
to defend their interests effectively through the political process.105
Serkin concludes that blanket protection of existing uses is unjustified.106
Although grandfathering existing uses and structures might be advisable
in cases in which the balance of interests tips in favor of existing use
protection, local governments should be given the power to terminate
nonconformities and, may exercise it without violating generally
applicable takings and due process standards.107
III. TWO MODELS OF ZONING REGULATION
My defense of existing use protection will proceed in two stages.
First, I discuss the place of existing use protection in the context of two
distinct models of zoning regulation. Second, I show why treating past
and future land use choices asymmetrically makes sense given the
normative function of property rights. In this section I will explore two
basic models for zoning regulation—comprehensive planning and
bargaining—and show that the logic of each model supports existing use
protection. Both models are ideal types. Zoning practice includes
102. See id. at 1279.
103. Id. at 1278-80. Serkin notes, however, that since owners of nonconformities are
unlikely to be able to exit a hostile jurisdiction at low cost, they may be particularly vulnerable
to exploitation by local governments. Id. at 1280. The political economy of land use regulation
does not, therefore, provide decisive reasons to favor or oppose special treatment of existing
uses. Id.
104. Serkin, supra note 6, at 1278-80.
105. See id.
106. Id. at 1290-91.
107. See id. at 1288-89.
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elements of both. Zoning regulation was originally conceived of as a
planning regulation and has evolved over the course of the twentieth
century to incorporate aspects of the bargaining model.108 Prohibition of
existing uses is in tension with both models of zoning. It is disfavored
under the comprehensive planning model because plans are primarily
guides for future development rather than tools to pre-existing land use
conflicts.109 To the extent that an existing use is a product of a bargain
between a developer and the local government, allowing the government
to prohibit existing uses gives at least the appearance of the government
going back on its word. Moreover, the inability of the government to
commit to protecting a developer from subsequent zoning changes could
significantly undermine the credibility in negotiations and thus be an
impediment to reaching agreements advantageous for local government.
A. Zoning and Planning
As a historical matter, zoning regulations are closely connected to
the idea of comprehensive land use planning. Zoning, as originally
conceived, involved the creation of comprehensive zoning maps that
divide all territory in a given jurisdiction into separate zones for different
types of uses.110 The zoning map was to guide development throughout
a jurisdiction and put landowners on notice about which general sorts of
development would be permitted on their land.111 Zoning codes were
seen as vehicles to implement land use plans and comprehensive
planning as a means to constrain arbitrary or haphazard application of
zoning regulations.112 Although early zoning codes did contain a process
for variances and amendments, these were intended for use in
exceptional cases.113 Rezonings are permissible under the Standard State
108. Philip L. Fraietta, Contract and Conditional Zoning Without Romance: A Public
Choice Analysis, 81 Fordham L. Rev. 1923, 1926-30 (2013).
109. Charles M. Haar, In Accordance with a Comprehensive Plan, 68 HARV. L. REV.
1154, 1155 (1955).
110. Zoning and Conditional Use Permits, INST. FOR LOC. GOV’T, https://www.cailg.org/hn-online-guide/zoning-and-conditional-use-permits (last visited Apr. 2, 2021).
111. WILLIAMS, JR. & TAYLOR, supra note 4, § 17.6.
112. Charles M. Haar, In Accordance with a Comprehensive Plan, 68 HARV. L. REV.
1154, 1154 (1955) (“For to the extent that zoning is properly to be conceived of as the partial
implementation of a plan of broader scope, zoning without planning lacks coherence and
discipline in the pursuit of goals of public welfare which the whole municipal regulatory
process is supposed to serve.”); Chamberlain & Pierson, supra note 52, at 187 (“So, even
though a court approves of the principle of zoning as embodied in the statute, it will not sustain
an ordinance which is not enacted in accordance with any ‘well-considered plan,’ but is
arbitrary and unreasonable in its requirements.”).
113. Alejandro Esteban Camacho, Mustering the Missing Voices: A Collaborative Model
for Fostering Equality, Community Involvement and Adaptive Planning in Land Use
Decisions: Installment One, 24 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 3, 11-12 (2005); Shelby D. Green,
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Zoning Enabling Act (SZEA) but procedurally cumbersome as befitting
a tool to be used only in rare circumstances.114 An extreme version of
this position is reflected in the “change or mistake” rule in several states,
which require a showing of changed circumstances or a mistake in the
original zoning code in order to revise any existing zoning
designation.115 The expectation, however, was that in the vast majority
of cases, landowners seeking to develop their land would apply for a
building permit, which would be granted or denied depending on
whether the proposed development complied with the pre-existing
zoning regulations.116 The original conception of zoning thus was that
most important questions would be settled by a comprehensive code and
that zoning determinations specific to particular parcels of land—
variances, and special permits—would play a secondary role and be
employed only to address exceptional, unforeseen circumstances.117
Although most courts were apparently willing to uphold zoning
codes that were prospective, comprehensive, and included procedural
protections for landowners, codes that did not fit the comprehensive
planning model were vulnerable to legal challenge. Early decisions
striking down zoning regulations occurred in instances in which there
was no zoning enabling act,118 there was no comprehensive map or
plan,119 or zoning was piecemeal.120 A leading early zoning proponent
argued that these deficiencies, as well as the lack of provision for zoning
appeals, explained the leading cases invalidating zoning regulations.121
Partially in response to such concerns, the Standard Zoning Enabling
Act, upon which many of the early zoning codes were modeled,122 stated
that zoning “regulations shall be made in accordance with a
comprehensive plan.”123 There is a long running controversy over how

Development Agreements: Bargained-For Zoning That Is Neither Illegal Contract Nor
Conditional Zoning, 33 CAP. U. L. REV. 383, 387 (2004).
114. Green, supra note 113, at 386-88.
115. WILLIAMS, JR. & TAYLOR, supra note 4, § 7.6.
116. Id.
117. Camacho, supra note 113, at 11-12; Green, supra note 113, at 387.
118. See, e.g., City of St. Louis v. Evraiff, 256 S.W. 489, 489-90 (Mo. 1923); State ex rel.
Better Built Home & Mortgage Co. v. McKelvey, 256 S. W. 495, 495 (Mo. 1923); State ex
rel. Penrose Inv. Co. v. McKelvey, 256 S.W. 474, 474 (Mo. 1923).
119. See, e.g., Spann v. City of Dallas, 235 S.W. 513, 517 (Tex. 1921).
120. Miller v. Bd. of Pub. Works, 195 Cal. 477 (1925).
121. Edward M. Bassett, Constitutionality of Zoning in Light of Recent Court Decisions,
13 NAT’L MUN. REV. 492, 494 (1924).
122. Green, supra note 113, at 385.
123. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, A STANDARD STATE ZONING ENABLING ACT §
3, at 6 n.22 (rev. ed. 1926).
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to understand the comprehensive plan requirement.124 In the early years
of zoning, local governments were not required to enact separate plans
and many created zoning codes in the absence of a comprehensive
plan.125 This lead courts to find that in such cases, the zoning map was
itself a comprehensive plan.126 In the mid-twentieth century, a number
of states, including California and Florida, adopted laws that required
local governments to adopt a comprehensive plan before issuing zoning
regulations.127 Most states still do not require a locality to create a
comprehensive plan in order to zone,128 but even in these states, courts
usually require that the zoning code itself be comprehensive rather than
piecemeal.129 At a minimum, a plan should cover the entire territory
over which the planning agency has jurisdiction.130 Zoning decisions
that appear arbitrary in light of the larger code are vulnerable to
invalidation as illegal “spot zoning.”131 By contrast, conformity to a
comprehensive plan is sometimes treated as evidence against a
regulatory taking claim.132
The requirement of conformity to a comprehensive plan is in part
motivated by concern to justify particular zoning regulations as serving
important public ends and not merely as a means to resolve private
conflicts between neighbors.133 A comprehensive scheme to channel
development in any particular jurisdiction is thought to benefit the
community as a whole. Courts upholding land use regulation typically
124. See Carol M. Rose, Planning and Dealing: Piecemeal Land Controls as a Problem
of Local Legitimacy, 71 CAL. L. REV. 837, 860-63 (1983) (discussing the evolution of “plan
jurisprudence” in the mid-twentieth century).
125. Haar, supra note 109, at 1157.
126. Edward J. Sullivan, Answered Prayers: The Dilemma of Binding Plans, in PLANNING
REFORM IN THE NEW CENTURY 138 (Daniel R. Mandelker ed., 2004).
127. Id.
128. MANDELKER & WOLF, supra note 4, § 3.14.
129. Id.; WILLIAMS, JR. & TAYLOR, supra note 4, § 7.5.
130. ROHAN & KELLY, supra note 16, § 37.01[1][b].
131. JUERGENSMEYER ET AL., supra note 2, § 5.10 (“A rezoning that looks like a spot on
the zoning map raises a ‘red flag’ of suspicion that the rezoning may have been done to serve
private, not public, interests. If the rezoning is shown to be in accord with the plan, that
concern is dispelled.”); 2 EDWARD H. ZIEGLER, J. RATHKOPF’S THE LAW OF ZONING AND
PLANNING § 28.01 (4th ed. 2020) (“No one particular characteristic associated with spot
zoning, except a failure to comply with at least the spirit of a comprehensive plan, is
necessarily fatal to the amendment.”).
132. See Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302, 33640 (2002); Norbeck Vill. Joint Venture v. Montgomery Cty. Council, 254 A.2d 700, 700 (Md.
1969); MANDELKER & WOLF, supra note 4, § 3.18.
133. Haar, supra note 109, at 1157-58 (“With the heavy presumption of constitutional
validity that attaches to legislation purportedly under the police power, and the difficulty in
judicially applying a ‘reasonableness’ standard, there is danger that zoning, considered as a
self-contained activity rather than as a means to a broader end, may tyrannize individual
property owners.”).
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point out the systemic nature of these benefits.134 The plan imposes a
system of restrictions on property owners so that each owner is restricted
somewhat in her use of her property but benefits from the restrictions
imposed on neighboring property owners.135 From the early days of
zoning, courts have suggested that state authority to regulate nonnuisance land uses through zoning law is connected to the status of
zoning regulation as a planning instrument. For instance, Jones v. City
of Los Angeles, which held that Los Angeles could not use zoning law
to prohibit an existing business that was not a nuisance, noted that courts
“have recognized that the right to use private property may be restricted
by an ordinance which follows a reasonable plan, even though the use is
neither a nuisance per se, nor a menace to the health, safety or morals in
the particular district from which it is excluded.”136 More recently, the
Court in Kelo suggested that conformity with a comprehensive plan is
evidence of a public use even when the ultimate recipient of the land
taken by eminent domain is a private party.137
B. The Role of Existing Use Protection in Comprehensive Zoning
As will be explained presently, the comprehensive planning model
of zoning is today, at best, a gross oversimplification of the nature of
zoning. Nevertheless, the roots of zoning regulation in comprehensive
land use planning helps to explain the ambiguous status of
nonconformities. Commitment to comprehensive planning lead early
zoning advocates to regard nonconformities unfavorably. Nonconforming uses undermine the uniformity of well-designed plans.
Insofar as the aim of a comprehensive planning is strict separation of
uses, the persistence of nonconforming uses perpetuates industrial or
commercial activities in an undesirable proximity to residential areas.
Insofar as the aims are aesthetic, nonconforming uses are eyesores on an
otherwise well-ordered landscape.
Despite the obvious tension between comprehensive zoning and the
protection of existing uses, the logic of comprehensive planning on
134. E.g., Village of Euclid v. Amber Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 391-94 (1926); Golden
v. Planning Bd., 30 N.Y.2d 359, 376-78 (N.Y. 1972).
135. Alfred Bettman, Constitutionality of Zoning, 37 HARV. L. REV. 834, 839 (1924) (“In
the case of a zone plan, each piece of property pays, in the form of reasonable regulation of
its use, for the protection which the plan gives to all property lying within the boundaries of
the plan.”).
136. Jones v. City of Los Angeles, 295 P. 14, 17 (Cal. 1930).
137. Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 483-84 (2005); Nicole Stelle Garnett,
Planning as Public Use?, 34 ECOLOGY L.Q. 443, 444 (2007). But see Gideon Kanner, We
Don’t Have to Follow Any Stinkin’ Planning – Sorry About That, Justice Stevens, 39 URB. L.
529, 530 (2007) (arguing the Kelo wildly overstates that legal force of comprehensive plans
and adopts a naïve view of their purposes and legal significance).
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balance supports protection of existing uses. Zoning regulations that
implement comprehensive plans are oriented toward guiding future
development rather than rearranging existing uses and structures.138 The
comprehensive planning model of zoning suggests that these regulations
should not be applied to existing non-nuisance land uses for at least five
reasons.
First, existing use protection mitigates the potential unfairness in
regulations that treat similarly situated landowners differently. Zoning
regulations differ from most other police power regulations in that they
impose a non-uniform set of rules. The function of a zoning code is to
establish different rules in different sectors so as to separate conflicting
uses. Zoning laws, therefore, permit activities in one area that they
prohibit in another. By contrast, ordinary police power regulations are
general in nature.139 They apply uniform rules across a given
jurisdiction.140 A checkerboard statute—a statute that imposes different
rules according to some entirely arbitrary pattern—is a stock example of
an unjust law.141 For example, a health regulation that applied to
restaurants located in even-numbered streets, but not odd-numbered
streets, would seem obviously unjust. A court would likely invalidate it
as arbitrary and capricious or as a violation of equal protection. Zoning
codes, however, are checkerboard statutes by design: the point of the
code is to apply different rules to different neighborhoods. Two highly
similar plots of land with identical uses may be treated very differently
depending on where lines are drawn on a map. Euclidian zoners try, of
course, to separate uses so that a use will be permitted where it fits with
its neighbors but prohibited where it does not.142 However, the need to

138. JUERGENSMEYER ET AL., supra note 2, § 2.10 (“The rational, comprehensive
planning process has four principal characteristics. First, it is future-oriented, establishing
goals and objectives for future land use and development approval or disapproval, and
municipal expenditures for capital improvements such as road construction and the
installation of municipal utilities.”).
139. See Brown v. Maryland, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 419, 442-43 (1827).
140. E.g., Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, Pub. L. 75-717, 52 Stat. 1040 (1938);
Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970 Pub. L. No. 91-596, 84 Stat. 1590 (1970).
141. RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE 179 (1986). Dworkin believes that zoning laws
are unobjectionable despite their checkerboard nature because they are not “matters of
principle.” This seems to miss an important feature of zoning regulation that differentiates it
from most other forms of regulation. The checkerboard nature of zoning regulations is
permissible because it is required for the regulation to fulfill its purpose. Application of other
police power regulations to property owners on every other street would usually be regarded
as unfair, even if the regulation did not concern a “matter of principle” by Dworkin’s lights,
so long as it allocated non-trivial benefits or burdens.
142. Rachael Watsky, The Problems With Euclidean Zoning, BOS. U. SCH. L. (July 19,
2018), http://sites.bu.edu/dome/2018/07/19/the-problems-with-euclidean-zoning/ (explaining
that the term comes from the Supreme Court case Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty, and
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draw sharp boundaries means that some decisions will necessarily be
somewhat arbitrary: for a given unzoned area, there is not likely to be a
single unique map dictated by basic principles of zoning. Insofar as a
zoning code attempts to do more than merely formalize existing
distinctions between neighborhoods, it will impose rules that treat
similar parcels of land differently. The contrast with ordinary police
power regulations is stark: checkerboard regulations concerning health,
safety, personal liberty, or any other matter serious enough to justify the
imposition of significant sanctions are inherently suspicious.143 A
checkerboard zoning map, on the other hand, is an entirely
unexceptionable outcome that serves the underlying purpose of
separating incompatible uses.144 Permitting continuation of existing uses
protects landowners to a considerable extent from ending up on the
wrong side of necessarily somewhat arbitrary lines.
Second, the requirement of comprehensiveness and prospective
nature of zoning are both serve to spread the benefits and burdens of
zoning regulation as widely as possible. Commentators often present
conforming use protection as a means of reducing political opposition
by “grandfathering” those property owners most likely to object.145 But
this is the flip side of a more principled rationale: existing use protection
reduces the risk that burdens of zoning will be highly concentrated
among a small number of landowners who suffer large losses.146
Meanwhile, the requirement that zoning codes are comprehensive
increases the probability that all landowners in the jurisdiction will
benefit in the long run. A well-conceived zoning code will tend to
produce widely dispersed benefits by reducing the chances that
neighbors will develop inconsistent land uses, protecting the character
and aesthetics of neighborhoods, expanding the tax base by increasing
property values, and channeling future development in ways that benefit
existing property owners. As already noted, comprehensive land use
planning was originally touted as having benefits for all landowners,
including those who were burdened by costly new restrictions on how
they could use their land.147 The extent to which zoning actually delivers
on these promises is controversial. Proponents, however, generally
argue that well-designed zoning codes benefit an entire community and

describes zoning which “divides towns into districts based on permitted uses, and in so doing,
creates specific zones where certain land uses are permitted or prohibited”).
143. See DWORKIN, supra note 141, at 179.
144. See id.
145. E.g., JUERGENSMEYER ET AL., supra note 2, § 4.31.
146. See Serkin, supra note 6, at 1267.
147. See Haar, supra note 109, at 1154; Chamberlain & Pierson, supra note 52, at 187.
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not only those landowners who wish to block development by their
immediate neighbors.148
The wide dispersal of benefits and burdens of comprehensive
zoning is often cited by both the Supreme Court149 and by lower courts150
as a factor in upholding zoning regulations. Property owners who are
burdened by zoning restrictions receive at least partial compensation in
the form of valuable restrictions on the land use choices of their
neighbors.151 Reciprocal advantage is a long-running theme in
regulatory takings jurisprudence dating back to Justice Holmes opinion
in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon.152 Defenders of land use
regulations tend to present them as an exchange of benefits and burdens
(perhaps not perfectly equal) rather than as a one-way imposition of
148. See, e.g., Peter Barnes, How Zoning Regulations Benefit Communities, YAHOO! FIN.
(Feb. 4, 2016), https://finance.yahoo.com/news/zoning-regulations-benefit-communities050508613.html.
149. E.g., Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1072-73 (1992) (Stevens J.,
dissenting) (“We have, therefore, in our takings law frequently looked to the generality of a
regulation of property. For example, in the case of so-called ‘developmental exactions,’ we
have paid special attention to the risk that particular landowners might ‘b[e] singled out to
bear the burden’ of a broader problem not of his own making. Nollan, 483 U.S., at 835, n.4;
see also Pennell v. San Jose, 485 U.S. 1, 23 (1988) . . . Perhaps the most familiar application
of this principle of generality arise in zoning cases. A diminution in value caused by a zoning
regulation is far less likely to constitute a taking if it is part of a general and comprehensive
land-use plan, see Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926); conversely, ‘spot zoning’
is far more likely to constitute a taking, see Penn Central, 438 U.S., at 132, and n. 28.”); Agins
v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 262 (1980), abrogated by Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc.,
544 U.S. 528 (2005) (“The zoning ordinances benefit the appellants as well as the public by
serving the city’s interest in assuring careful and orderly development of residential property
with provision for open-space areas. There is no indication that the appellants’ 5-acre tract is
the only property affected by the ordinances. Appellants therefore will share with other owners
the benefits and burdens of the city’s exercise of its police power.”).
150. San Remo Hotel v. City & Cty. of San Francisco., 41 P.3d 87, 98 (Cal. 2002) (“The
breadth or narrowness of the class burdened by the regulation, the extent to which a regulation
defeats the owner’s reasonable investment-backed expectations, and the extent to which the
affected property is also benefited by the regulation are certainly pertinent to whether a
regulation works a taking.”); Haas v. City & Cty. of San Francisco, 605 F.2d 1117, 1121 (9th
Cir. 1979) (citing Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 133-34 n.30
(1978) (“The record contains not the slightest suggestion that the land use regulations at issue
involved ‘reverse spot’ zoning. On the contrary, the land use controls were part of a
comprehensive plan for the development of the City to preserve aesthetic values and other
general welfare interests of the inhabitants. The land use restrictions ‘were reasonably related
to the implementation of a policy . . . expected to produce a widespread public benefit and
applicable to all similarly situated property.’ All of Haas’ neighbors are subject to the same
restrictions upon the future development of their property as those imposed upon Haas. To be
sure, at the moment, Haas appears to have suffered a disproportionate impact because no other
affected landowner has as large a parcel of undeveloped land as does Haas. Nevertheless, all
of the landowners in the Russian Hill area are no more able than is Haas to redevelop their
property, either alone, or in combination with other landowners, for high-rise apartments.”).
151. See Haas, 605 F.2d at 1121.
152. Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922); see generally Thomas W. Merrill,
The Character of the Governmental Action, 36 VT. L. REV. 649 (2012).
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restrictions in a property owner. In Penn Central, part of the
disagreement between Justice Brennan’s majority opinion and Justice
Rehnquist’s dissent hinged on whether the historic landmark designation
of Grand Central Station should be seen as part of a system of regulation
of historically significant buildings with broad advantages accruing to
all property owners or as an isolated imposition on the owners of Grand
Central Station for the benefit of others.153 Justice Brennan contrasted
New York City’s policy of historical preservation with illegal spot
zoning:
In contrast to discriminatory zoning, which is the antithesis of landuse control as part of some comprehensive plan, the New York City
law embodies a comprehensive plan to preserve structures of historic
or aesthetic interests wherever they might be found in the city, and
as noted, over 400 landmarks and 31 historic districts have been
designated pursuant to this plan.154

Rehnquist agreed that zoning regulations were constitutionally
permissible because although they “at times reduce[] individual property
values, the burden is shared relatively evenly and it is reasonable to
conclude that on the whole an individual who is harmed by one aspect
of the zoning will be benefited by another.”155 But he argued that the
“multimillion dollar loss . . . imposed . . . is uniquely felt and is not offset
by any benefits flowing from the preservation of some 400 other
‘landmarks’ in New York City.”156
Existing use protection serves to balance the burdens and benefits
of regulation somewhat more equally. Even well-designed zoning codes
pose a risk that the burdens of zoning regulation will be concentrated
among only a few property owners. Although whether a use is an
existing use or a future use does not perfectly track the burden imposed
by new zoning regulations, owners of nonconforming properties are one
of the two groups (along with owners of undeveloped property) that
would be most likely to suffer large losses as a result of new zoning
regulations.157 Protection of existing uses mitigates the burdens on those
property owners whose hitherto legal activities are proscribed by the new
code.158 It thereby decreases the odds that zoning regulation will
function primarily to transfer wealth from one group of property owners
(the nonconformers) to another (the conformers). A new zoning law that
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.

See Penn Central Transp. Co., 438 U.S. at 152-53 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
Id. at 132.
Id. at 147 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
Id.
Ellickson, supra note 11, at 699-701.
See Serkin, supra note 6, at 1224-25.
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applied equally to existing and future uses would have quite different
effects on landowners depending on their present activities. Owners of
land devoted to uses prohibited by the new code would be
disproportionately burdened while other landowners would
disproportionately benefit. Strongly prospective zoning regulations, by
contrast, have more similar implications for all landowners in a given
zone. Owners of both conforming and nonconforming properties are
forbidden from commencing any future use inconsistent with the new
zoning regulation.159 Although owners of nonconforming properties
may gain some special advantage from being allowed to continue
nonconforming activities, this advantage is limited by the prohibition on
expanding nonconforming uses or switching to another type of use.160
Nonconforming houses cannot be expanded and sometimes cannot be
rebuilt. Businesses are not permitted to expand, and commercial and
industrial properties cannot be converted to a new use.161 Owners of
nonconformities are, therefore, burdened by new regulations, usually to
a greater extent than their neighbors. And because existing use
protection does not immunize landowners who operate nuisances, land
uses that impose particularly heavy burdens on their neighbors are not
protected.162
Concern that losses from zoning regulation are not excessively
concentrated is especially pressing in light of a third feature of
comprehensive land use planning: zoning serves many purposes that are
far less urgent than the removal of nuisances. This factor seems to be
central to the reasoning in Jones v. City of Los Angeles, which blocked
Los Angeles’ attempt to require removal of existing facilities for the
mentally ill:
Zoning is not so limited in its purposes. It may take into
consideration factors which bear no relation to the public health,
safety or morals, but which come within the meaning of the broader
term “general welfare”. It deals with many uses of property which
are in no way harmful. If its objects are so much broader than those
of nuisance regulation; if its invasion of private property interests is
more extensive; and if the public necessity to justify its exercise need
not be so pressing, then does it not follow that its means of regulation

159. E.g., CITY OF SAN JOSE, DEP’T OF PLANNING, BLDG. & CODE ENF’T, WHAT IS A
LEGAL
NONCONFORMING
USE?
(2003),
https://www.sanjoseca.gov/home/showpublisheddocument?id=15487.
160. See supra Part II.A.
161. See id.
162. See Dix W. Noel, Retroactive Zoning and Nuisances, 41 COLUM. L. REV. 457, 473
(1941).
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must be more reasonable and less destructive of established
interests?163

Zoning codes prohibit structures and uses that are not, in the vast
majority of cases, socially undesirable.164 The objectives of zoning are
extremely varied and include prevention of conflicting uses, protection
of the tax base, environmental protection, aesthetic appeal and
uniformity, prevention of overcrowding, regulation of access to locally
provided public goods, public health and safety, enhancement of
property values, etc.165 In order to serve these ends, zoning regulations
are applied selectively so that extremely similar parcels of land with
identical uses may be subject to differing legal regimes depending on
where they are located. And the rules within a given zone are likely to
render some properties nonconforming even if they are devoted to the
right general sort of activity: residential property, for example, may be
subject to regulations regarding occupancy, lot size, frontage,
appearance, height, and so on.166 As a consequence, even a welldesigned zoning code will render nonconforming a variety of uses that
cause, at most, only very marginal social harm. Land uses that present
serious threats to the peace, health, or safety of neighbors may be
terminated as nuisances; it is not uncommon for courts to refuse to grant
existing use protection on these grounds.167 This means that existing use
protection only attaches to uses that cause small, more attenuated, or
more abstract harms, including those of an aesthetic or more inchoate
economic nature.
The social benefit of eliminating many
nonconforming uses is often fairly attenuated. It is possible that current
limitations on nonconforming properties already go too far in many
cases. Nicole Garnett has recently argued that restrictions on altering or

163. Jones v. City of Los Angeles, 295 P. 14, 17 (Cal. 1930)
164. See, e.g., Vill. of Euclid v. Amber Realty, 272 U.S. 365, 388 (“A nuisance may be
merely a right thing in the wrong place, like a pig in the parlor instead of the barnyard.”);
Roberts, supra note 54, at 289 (“Most courts probably are not willing to attach the nuisance
label to a nonconforming use unless its deleterious effects are fairly clear and substantial.
Nuisance has always been associated with uses which cause relatively concrete harm to the
enjoyment of surrounding property. In the cases applying an expanded concept of nuisance
the damage which the offending uses threatened was much more serious than most zoning
regulations are intended to cure.”).
165. ROHAN & KELLY, supra note 16, § 37.01[5] (“There is very little doubt, however,
that state enabling laws and current community plans extend beyond the prevention of
neighborhood nuisances and the adoption of fair procedures.”).
166. See, e.g., CTY. OF SAN MATEO, PLANNING & BLDG. DEPT., ZONING REGULATIONS
(2020), https://planning.smcgov.org/sites/planning.smcgov.org/files/SMC_Zoning_Regulati
ons.pdf.
167. See, e.g., Brown v. Grant, 2 S.W.2d 285, 287 (Tex. Civ. App. 1928).
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expanding non-conforming uses contribute to urban decay in aging
cities.168
Interestingly, Kathy Kolnick found that even after the City of Los
Angeles won a landmark legal victory in Hadacheck, allowing it to force
commercial and industrial businesses out of newly designated residential
districts, most of the now ostensibly illegal business continued on in their
former locations.169 It is hard not to see this as evidence against the need
for strict separation of uses, at least when the commercial uses involve
laundries and the like (as was often the case with the businesses in
question) rather than heavy industry or other obviously burdensome
uses.170
A fourth reason to favor existing use protection is that the use of
zoning regulation to terminate existing structures and uses threaten to
undermine the function of property rights of dividing spheres of
authority. Property rights define the sphere of control and set a baseline
for subsequent voluntary modification of these rights and duties by
contract. They codify a norm of the following sort: “I respect my
neighbor’s decisions with respect to her property, and she respects my
decisions with respect to mine.” There are, of course, borderline cases
in which an act has significant effects on both properties. A complete
set of property rights will determine rights in such cases so that each
property owner has a compatible set of rights and duties.171 The value
of each property will depend on its attributes and the rights of the owner.
Neighbors unhappy with their allotment of rights and duties may try to
negotiate exchanges.172 For example, if I find it inconvenient that I am
not allowed to drive over my neighbor’s lot, I might try to negotiate an
easement that would allow me to do so.
Rather than securing the voluntary agreements with neighbors,
zoning regulation allows disaffected property owners to bypass common
law remedies and voluntary negotiation in order to restrict the activities
of their neighbors. Protection of existing uses converts zoning
regulation which prevents zoning law from being used as a tool for the
mediation of law disputes and restricts it largely to the domain of

168. NICOLE STELLE GARNETT, ORDERING THE CITY: LAND USE, POLICING, AND THE
RESTORATION OF URBAN AMERICA 198-99 (2010).
169. Kathy A. Kolnick, Order Before Zoning: Land Use Regulation in Los Angeles,
1880–1915, at 245 (May 2008) (unpublished PhD dissertation, University of Southern
California), https://digitallibrary.usc.edu/cdm/ref/collection/p15799coll127/id/61051.
170. Id. at 122.
171. Richard A. Epstein, Bundle-of-Rights Theory as a Bulwark Against Statist
Conceptions of Private Property, 8 ECON J. WATCH 223, 230-32 (2011).
172. Ellickson, supra note 11, at 711-719.
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prevention of land use conflicts and regulation of development.173
Zoning regulation, in its present form, serves the dual function of
preventing neighbors from developing inconsistent plans for their
properties and assuring landowners that neighbors will not make
undesirable changes.174 Allowing local governments to use zoning
regulations to terminate existing uses would encourage aggressive
actions against one’s neighbors’ present activities and does not
discourage consensual resolution of land use disputes. At worst,
purchasing property next to nonconforming uses and then lobbying for
zoning changes could be a business strategy.175 Permitting aggressive
use of zoning regulation could create land use conflicts in situations
where the current neighbors are not especially bothered by a
nonconformity.
The nuisance exception to existing use protection is consistent with
the logic of zoning regulation being aimed at dispute avoidance rather
than dispute resolution. Nuisances are activities that impose significant
and non-reciprocal burdens on neighbors: noise, foul odors, dangerous
conditions, etc.176 Because there is no right to operate a nuisance under
common law, eradication of such burdens is not an infringement of the
property owner’s pre-existing legal rights, but merely enforcement of the
pre-existing common law rights of neighbors.177 By contrast, regulation
of lesser sorts of burdens does alter legal entitlements. Prohibition of
multi-family housing on a parcel might raise the land value of its
neighbors if would-be buyers prefer not to live next to apartment
buildings. But because multi-family housing is not a nuisance, doing so
alters the pre-existing distribution of legal rights.
A fifth consideration in favor of applying comprehensive zoning
codes only to future uses is that better alignment of the interests of
landowners in a particular zone increases the chances of well-designed
regulation. Aside from any concern with the fairness of burdening the
owners of non-conformities to benefit their neighbors, the prospect of
terminating existing uses pits the interests of neighboring landowners
against one another in regulatory policymaking. Although one might
173. Or, perhaps, to regulate conflicts over development.
174. See Ellickson, supra note 11, at 699-701.
175. Under the current legal regime, entrepreneurs might purchase both a nonconforming
property and adjacent parcels in order to capture economic gains from eliminating the
nonconformity. Significantly, however, in this case the entrepreneur must bear that cost of
buying out the owner of the nonconforming property and thus will only eliminating
nonconforming uses in cases in which the economic gains outweigh the losses.
176. See RESTATEMENT 2D OF TORTS § 821D (AM. LAW INST. 1979) (defining a private
nuisance as a “nontrespassory invasion of another’s interest in the private use and enjoyment
of land.”).
177. See, e.g., Conrad v. City of Beebe, 388 S.W.3d 465, 469 (Ark. Ct. App. 2012).
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wish that property owners seeking to terminate their neighbors’ existing
uses will prevail in the zoning process only when the balance of policy
considerations tilts in their favor, local zoning regulation depends on a
host of local political dynamics aside from the merits of a proposed
regulation.
Sometimes local governments may be justified in
terminating existing uses, but often they will not. By contrast, protection
of existing uses sets up a regulatory context in which the interests of all
landowners in a zone are better aligned. When only prospective uses are
prohibited, all landowners share in the benefits of restrictions on their
neighbors’ activities, and all landowners, including owners of
nonconforming properties, are burdened by the new restrictions. The
principal exception is owners of undeveloped property who wish to
develop, who tend to be disproportionately burdened by new zoning
rules. Existing use protection, however, has no effect on this group.
Classical zoning codes are a sort of public plan that is designed so
as to minimize potential conflicts in the plans developed by private
landowners and provide for orderly future development according to the
principles of rational land use.178 The comprehensive nature of zoning
codes produces widely dispersed benefits, but also subjects landowners
to starkly different rules depending on where their property falls on the
zoning map.179 The protection of existing uses mitigates the danger of
highly concentrated costs and the potential unfairness of subjecting
different landowners to different rules that may be based on the planning
boards’ views of desirable future development rather than the present
character of the neighborhood. A zoning regulation not made according
to some general plan is a use of regulatory authority to resolve a
particular law use conflict. Such a resolution, by its very nature, evades
the common law principles that would have governed the conflict in its
absence and thus should trigger concern land use law is being used for
private ends. As will be discussed below, zoning practice has evolved
away from the planning model in some respects. Nevertheless, the logic
of comprehensive planning is one source of the intuition that existing
uses should be treated differently than future uses.
C. Bargaining and Contemporary Zoning
Although the logic of comprehensive planning was central to the
original understanding of zoning regulation, zoning practice in the
United States has developed in ways that clearly are in tension with this
model. The level of foresight needed to translate a general and
178. See WILLIAMS, JR. & TAYLOR, supra note 4, § 17.7.
179. See WILLIAMS, JR. & TAYLOR, supra note 4, § 17.8.
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somewhat abstract master plan into a detailed zoning code has often
proven unrealistic for several reasons. First, local governments find it
difficult to project future conditions decades in advance.180 Second, the
impact of development on local public infrastructure and public services
makes local governments hesitant to adopt a permissive approach to
zoning undeveloped land even when future development is anticipated
and desired.181 Finally, the strict separation of uses contemplated by
Euclidian zoning seems too restrictive in light of the advantages of
mixed use neighborhoods.182 As skepticism about the feasibility and
desirability of detailed, long-term land use planning has grown, zoning
practice has evolved toward an approach that I will refer to as the
“bargaining model.”183 Unlike the planning model, which suggests that
new development should generally conform to a pre-existing
comprehensive plan and comprehensive zoning code, new development
under the bargaining model is the result of protracted, project-specific
negotiation between a developer and a local government.184
The perceived inadequacy of Euclidian zoning has changed zoning
practice in a number of ways. Local governments often do not zone most
undeveloped land for intensive development but instead use restrictive
zoning designations so as to make case-by-case zoning determinations

180. See Jenny Schuetz, Is zoning a useful tool or a regulatory barrier?, BROOKINGS (Oct.
31, 2019), https://www.brookings.edu/research/is-zoning-a-useful-tool-or-a-regulatorybarrier/.
181. See FISCHEL, supra note 61, at 129.
182. See generally Roderick M. Hills, Jr. & David Schleicher, The Steep Costs of Using
Noncumulative Zoning to Preserve Land for Urban Manufacturing, 77 U. CHI. L. REV. 249
(2010) (arguing that residential development should be permitted in industrial zones).
183. Daniel P. Selmi, The Contract Transformation in Land Use Regulation, 63 STAN. L.
REV. 591, 593 (2011) (“In recent years, however, the form of land use regulation has changed
significantly to incorporate a contract model. Instead of the traditional, hierarchical permit
process, land use approvals are now increasingly the subject of negotiations leading to binding
contracts between local governments and development interests.”); Alejandro Esteban
Camacho, Mustering the Missing Voices: A Collaborative Model for Fostering Equality,
Community Involvement and Adaptive Planning in Land Use Decisions: Installment Two, 24
STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 269, 270 (2005) (“The shift in land use regulation from a primarily
command and control approach to an extemporized, negotiated mode has steadily gained
momentum, despite initial criticism from many courts and commentators.”); Green, supra
note 113, at 389 (“It seems that nearly a century of zoning experience shows a very different
practice than first contemplated by the standard act, such that current zoning practice little
resembles the early notion of planned development . . . . Rather than rigid adherence to the
zoning map, the current model for land use control is through bargaining, making
particularized decisions regarding the suitability of a proposed use, and thus in effect
administering land development on a case-by-case basis.”); FISCHEL, supra note 61, at 363
(“Hostility to contract zoning seems to have abated considerably in the last quarter century.
Communities seem willing to put dollar amounts on rezonings.”).
184. See Erin Ryan, Zoning, Taking, and Dealing: The Problems and Promise of
Bargaining in Land Use Planning, 7 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 337, 338 (2002).
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and to retain leverage over developers.185 Restrictive zoning of
undeveloped land forces developers to win approval for measures that
alter existing zoning rules such as zoning variances, special use permits,
zoning amendments as well as, in many instances, a site plan.186 The
rise of negotiated zoning regulation has encouraged the use of
“conditional zoning” arrangements.187 Under conditional zoning,
developers agree to impose certain restrictions of the use of their
property in exchange for receiving the zoning treatment necessary for a
proposed development.188 Such conditions might either be attached
administratively in a special permit or variance or be imposed as part of
a rezoning.189 In response to the perceived inflexibility of traditional
Euclidian zoning, new zoning designations have been developed to
facilitate a more flexible approach. “Floating zones” are defined in the
zoning code, but not located on the zoning map until a developer submits
a successful application to “land” the floating zone on a particular
property.190 Planned Unit Developments (PUDs) allow developers to
pursue mixed use projects that do not fit within traditional zoning
categories.191 Because both floating zoning and PUDs are initiated by a
developer and require individualized review, both types of zoning
encourage increased bargaining and conditional zoning more
generally.192
All of these developments have increased the importance of
negotiations between local governments and developers. Courts have
traditionally disapproved of “contract zoning” on the grounds that it is
unconstitutional for a governmental body to contract away its police
power. 193 Despite the long history of judicial disapproval of contract
zoning, local governments now often conclude formal development
185. Babcock, supra note 4, at 32 (“[M]ost communities with areas faced with
development pressure have adopted a ‘wait and see’ regulatory approach. Large areas of
vacant land are placed in zoning districts in which the development allowed under the
regulations is not likely to prove economic.”).
186. See, e.g., Green, supra note 113, at 389.
187. See David L. Callies & Julie A. Tappendorf, Unconstitutional Land Development
Conditions and the Development Agreement Solution: Bargaining for Public Facilities after
Nollan and Dolan, 51 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 663, 665 (2001).
188. This practice is controversial. See MANDELKER & WOLF, supra note 4, § 6.59
(“Despite growing judicial approval of conditional zoning, its use by municipalities is often
unwise.”).
189. In general, the latter sort of conditional zoning is more legally fraught than the
former. See JUERGENSMEYER ET AL., supra note 2, § 5.11.
190. Selmi, supra note 183, at 601.
191. Id.
192. Id. at 602.
193. See Vicki Been, Community Benefits Agreements: A New Local Government Tool or
Another Variation on the Exactions Theme?, 77 U. CHI. L. REV. 5, 12 (2010).
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agreements with developers.194 And courts usually uphold such
contracts so long as they do not go too far in freezing existing zoning
regulations and thus abrogating the police power.195
These
“development agreements” allow local governments to secure support
for infrastructure upgrades in exchange for giving developers legal
certainty at an earlier stage than they would under standard vested rights
doctrine.196
More recently, some developers have negotiated
Community Benefits Agreements with community groups representing
neighbors and other interested parties under which the developer agrees
to certain conditions in exchange for community groups agreeing not to
oppose the development.197 The cumulative effect of these changes is
that rather than reflecting the logic of a comprehensive plan, zoning
decisions are now often made on a case-by-case basis. As Vicki Been
has observed, “zoning has moved from a set of rigid prescriptive rules
about land use to a more flexible set of standards, which allow the
specifics of the requirements imposed on each proposed development to
vary with the threatened impacts of the project and the concerns of the
various interest groups affected by the proposal.”198
The rise of the bargaining model of land use regulation has several
important implications for existing uses. First, insofar as developments
result from protracted negotiations between local governments and
property owners, a subsequent adverse change in zoning regulation may
give the appearance of reneging on an implicit agreement. Although
changing legal rules may appear unfair to those who have relied on the
old rules, laws must sometimes change if we are to have a functional
legal system. Going back on bargained agreements is another matter
altogether. Because of constitutional limitations on abrogation of the
police power, even bargained zoning designations are not legal
contracts.199 Nevertheless, it smacks of unfairness for local governments

194. See Selmi, supra note 183, at 593.
195. MANDELKER & WOLF, supra note 4, § 6.23; JUERGENSMEYER ET AL., supra note 2,
§ 5.31 (“The idea of a ‘development agreement ordinance’ is oxymoronic under the view of
early decisions that condemned contract zoning. Yet, times have changed, and, as with the
trend to accept conditional zoning, legislatures and courts increasingly accept development
agreements as legitimate planning tools.”). E.g., Giger v. City of Omaha, 442 N.W.2d 182,
192 (Neb. 1989) (“In fact, this agreement is in reality an enhancement of the city’s police
power. An examination of the development agreement and the evidence at trial establishes
that the agreement provides more restrictive ceilings and development regulations than the
current underlying zoning regulations.”).
196. See generally Selmi, supra note 183.
197. See generally Been, supra note 193.
198. Id. at 12.
199. MANDELKER & WOLF, supra note 4, § 6.22 (“Though a developer’s agreement is a
contract, it is not an independent contractual source of obligation. A developer’s agreement is
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to revisit zoning decisions made at the conclusion of negations with a
developer after the developer has made various concessions to secure a
certain zoning designation. The unsavory character of such zoning
changes makes it more likely that courts will find them to be takings or
violations of due process even when standard doctrinal analysis is
equivocal and even when there is a strong case that the concessions to
the developer were unwise as a matter of public policy.
Second, bargaining between developers and local governments
implicitly relies upon the grandfathering of existing uses to protect the
interests of developers.
Because local governments are not
constitutionally permitted to alienate police power by contract,200
development agreements and the like that commit local governments to
maintain a particular zoning designation far beyond the completion of a
development are vulnerable to legal challenge.201 But because the
developer obtains “vested rights” once building permits are granted, the
developer can rely upon the zoning designation specified in the
development agreement once the project is well underway.202 The
agreement, therefore, functions as a sort of a bridge between the
initiation of the project and vesting of rights.203 It relies on the
background understanding that completed (and most partially
completed) projects receive legal protection from subsequent zoning
changes.204 After bargaining for the right to begin construction, the
developer need not worry about the risks of subsequent zoning
changes.205 This has value for local governments as well. Without
protection for existing uses, governmental pledges not to change zoning
rules until rights vest would be less valuable because developers and
their transferees might worry that subsequent officials could go back on
an agreement. For this reason, existing use protection probably increases
local government’s ability to exact concessions in exchange for building
permits.
The importance of this consideration is difficult to assess. In many
cases, developers may have little reason, even absent existing use
protection, to worry that zoning changes will threaten the legal status of
a development or frighten potential buyers. Local governments have a
strong disincentive to choose zoning rules in ways that severely diminish
an ancillary instrument which exists as a tool for the implementation of the resolution
establishing the conditions.”).
200. See Bos. Beer Co. v. Massachusetts, 97 U.S. 25, 31 (1877).
201. Selmi, supra note 183, at 620-21.
202. See MANDELKER & WOLF, supra note 4, § 6.12.
203. Selmi, supra note 183, at 607-11.
204. MANDELKER & WOLF, supra note 4, §6.12.
205. Id.
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property values and thus threaten the tax base.206 On the other hand,
legal certainty is appealing because it spares developers and those to
whom they might sell property from having to assess the regulatory risk
of rezoning in the distant future. This might increase resale value by
facilitating transfer to outsiders who know little about the local
government, even in those cases in which the true regulatory risk is quite
modest. Developers’ preference for zoning regulation provides some
evidence that their buyers value legal certainty and thus would react
unfavorably to a legal regime that did not include existing use
protection.207
Third, to the extent that zoning regulation is done not according to
a comprehensive plan, but rather on a case-by-case basis, the argument
for terminating existing uses is much weaker. Much of the original
concern about the persistence of non-conforming property was that they
undermine the benefits of rational planning. But if zoning designations
reflect a series of ad hoc deals with developers rather than a consistent
policy to guide development, it is hard to see why this should be of
special concern. As Richard Babcock observed in an insightful 1972
address,
it is apparent that wait-and-see zoning makes traditional concepts of
nonconforming use obsolete. The whole concept of nonconforming
uses depends on the self-executing regulations that have long-term
stability. The wait-and-see approach to zoning undercuts the very
basis of the idea of ‘nonconforming use’ – the idea that there are
meaningful regulations to which a use can ‘conform.’208

Not only do case-by-case zoning decisions undercut the
significance of nonconformity with zoning, they strengthen the case that
elimination of nonconforming uses is unfair to their owners. Requiring
that property owners give up some valuable opportunities for future
development is much more palatable if this is done as part of a scheme
that gives benefits to the landowners who bear the burdens of land use
regulation. But if every zoning decision more or less stands on its own,
then the benefits that a property owner receives from the restrictions on
the rights of other landowners do not in any real sense depend on the
same considerations that require restrictions on the property owner’s
land use choices.
Part of the reason for the rise of zoning by negotiation is the
increasing importance of fiscal zoning. Much contemporary zoning
206. See FISCHEL, supra note 61, at 213-14.
207. Id. at 180 (“[D]eveloper support for zoning was founded on the need to induce
homeowners to invest their savings in a large, undiversified asset.”).
208. Babcock, supra note 4, at 34.
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regulation is aimed at protecting taxpayers by restricting access to local
public goods.209 Minimum lot sizes, restrictions on multi-family
dwellings, and other common regulations are centrally concerned with
preventing residents from consuming far more in services than they
contribute in tax dollars.210 They do so, not directly by charging for
public services, but indirectly by preventing construction of residences
that contribute relatively little to the tax base on a per capita basis.211 In
such cases, the elimination of an existing use (assuming that the
regulation is well designed to protect the local tax base) causes a transfer
of wealth from the burdened landowner to other local residents.212 The
fairness of termination of existing uses in such cases is questionable. In
many cases, the nonconformity will impose little non-fiscal burden on
its neighbors since the reasons for (e.g., minimum lot sizes) have little
or nothing to do with the impact on adjacent plots. Whatever the merits
of fiscal zoning in the abstract, it is difficult to see how it can justify
forcing incumbent landowners to make costly alterations or to move
away entirely. When zoning is undertaken for fiscal reasons, it is likely
that local governments would grandfather existing structures even if
permitted to do otherwise by state government and the courts. But were
local jurisdiction given free rein, at least a few would probably use this
power to force conversion of multi-family rental property into single
family homes or undertake other exclusionary measures. Existing use
protection thus has value as a check on fiscal zoning.
IV. ZONING AND PROPERTY RIGHTS
A. Property and Plans: The Value of Ownership
Zoning regulation, both as originally conceived and as it has
evolved over the twentieth century, has reshaped property rights in land.
Early opponents perceived zoning regulation as a threat to the liberal
conception of property.213 In this section, I will discuss the normative
significance of property ownership, explore how zoning regulation
posed a threat to liberal property rights and show how existing use
protection represents a compromise between the interests of property

209. See FISCHEL, supra note 61, at 138-62.
210. See generally William A. Fischel, Fiscal Zoning and Economists’ Views of the
Property Tax (Lincoln Inst. of Land Policy, Working Paper, 2013),
https://landuselaw.wustl.edu/Articles/Fischel%20Article.pdf.
211. See FISCHEL, supra note 61, at 131-32.
212. See id.
213. E.g., Ambler Realty Co. v. Vill. of Euclid, 297 F. 307, 314 (N. D. Ohio 1924), rev’d,
Vill. of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
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owners in control over their property and the need for greater public
control over land use choices.
The connection between property rights and freedom is central to
the liberal tradition. Anglo-American liberals, both right- and leftleaning, have embraced this link, although they sometimes provided
quite different analyses of the nature of freedom and its connection to
property.214 The importance of property rights for John Locke’s account
of liberal political order is well known.215 In this tradition, the right to
own private property is a natural liberty that pre-exists government and
serves as a limitation on the authority of the state.216 Sometimes less
remembered, at least in the Anglo-American circles, is that German
Idealists such as Kant, Hegel, and Fichte also saw a close connection
between property ownership and freedom.217 It is this Kantian tradition
that is especially interesting for present purposes.218 Kant, Hegel, and
Fichte argued that property ownership is normatively important because
it provides a sphere of exclusive control for property owners.219 Unlike
Locke, who argued that property could be acquired by mixing one’s
labor,220 Hegel and Fichte believed that property rights could be acquired
merely by incorporating an unowned object into one’s plans.221
According to this “will theory” of property, property rights are grounded
in a person’s interest in acting freely.222 Incorporating an object into
214. Compare RICHARD PIPES, PROPERTY AND FREEDOM (2000), with Jedediah Purdy, A
Freedom-Promoting Approach to Property: A Renewed Tradition for New Debates, 72 U.
CHI. L. REV. 1237 (2005).
215. 2 JOHN LOCKE, THE TWO TREATISES OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT ch. 5 (Thomas Hollis
ed., London 1764) (1689) (justifying first appropriation of property in the state of nature and
explaining the legitimacy of government in terms of the protection of life, liberty and
property).
216. Id.
217. Kant argued that property rights were necessary for people to live in a “relation of
right” because they define a sphere of free action for each individual. IMMANUEL KANT, THE
METAPHYSICS OF MORALS, 38-39 [6:248]-[6:250], 44-46 [6:255]-[6:257] (Mary Gregor
trans., 1996); ARTHUR RIPSTEIN, FORCE AND FREEDOM: KANT’S LEGAL AND POLITICAL
PHILOSOPHY 267-99 (2009). Hegel argued that property ownership provides a “sphere of
freedom” which allows for the exercise of free will. G. W. F. HEGEL, ELEMENTS OF THE
PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT §41-52, §208, §217 (Allen W. Wood ed., T. M. Knox trans., 1952).
Fichte held a similar view. JOHANN GOTTLIEB FICHTE, FOUNDATIONS OF NATURAL RIGHT
§10 at 106 (Frederick Neuhouser ed., Michael Baur trans., 2005).
218. Appeal to this strain of Kantian political philosophy does not require acceptance of
Kantian moral philosophy. Consequentialists and others who reject Kantian moral theory can
embrace this analysis of the value of property rights without conceding ground to Kantians in
their disagreements in moral philosophy.
219. See supra note 217 and accompanying text.
220. LOCKE, supra note 215, at ch. 5.
221. See supra note 217 and accompanying text.
222. For example, Fichte contended that “The part of the sensible world that is known to
me and subjected to my ends—even if only in thought—is originally my property . . . . No
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one’s plans gives others a duty not to interfere with the object without
permission because doing so interferes with the free choices of the
property owner.
Whether or not the “will theory” is a compelling theory of property
acquisition, it illuminates an important part of the value of property
ownership. The normative function of private property, on the Kantian
theory, is that it gives the property owner the right to use an object “set
and pursue [her] own ends.”223 One’s property holdings create a sphere
of control in which one can determine, revise, and carry out one’s freely
chosen projects. Property rights violations infringe on the right of the
owner to set and revise ends free from outside interference. The idea
here is that once an object has been incorporated into a person’s plans,
interfering with that object disrupts that person’s ability to make and
carry out plans. A truly free person is one who not only makes choices,
but one whose choices are efficacious in the world. Some choices are
aimed at more or less immediate goals: I am thirsty and so drink the glass
of water on the table. Other goals, however, can only be achieved by
plans that unfold over time.224 Complex plans may have a nested
structure with many subplans that must be completed in order to achieve
an overarching long-term goal. I might do A today so that I can do B
tomorrow, or so that I have the option of doing B or C tomorrow, or so
that I will be able to do E, F, and G in exactly that order over the coming
years. Property ownership is important because property provides a
material domain in which to make plans.
A sphere of exclusive control allows a person to develop her plans
over time without outside interference. Because a property owner
typically has the ultimate authority with respect to her property, property
ownership allows a person to act in pursuit of long-range plans with
confidence that her choices will be efficacious. I can build a house on
my land without worrying that others will tear it down or occupy it. I
may plant a garden, decorate my house how I please, build a workshop
in it (or not), and so on. My personal property is likewise mine to use,
store, exchange, give away or abandon as I please. Land, however, has
a special relationship to property as a means to exercise free agency
because land ownership provides a physical expanse in which the
owner’s decisions are, within broad limits, authoritative. Personal
one can affect that part of the sensible world without restricting the freedom of my efficacy.”
FICHTE, supra note 217, §10 at 106; SCOTT SHAPIRO, LEGALITY ch. 5 (2011).
223. RIPSTEIN, supra note 217, at 67.
224. Plans have been the subject of much interesting recent work in moral and legal
philosophy. See generally MICHAEL E. BRATMAN, INTENTION, PLANS AND PRACTICAL
REASON (1999); SHAPIRO, supra note 222. I am concerned here primarily with planning by
individuals, not the sort of collective plans considered by Shapiro.
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property, however great its economic value or personal meaning, does
not perform the same function because it does not provide a physical
territory in which an owner’s decisions have authority. Personal
property is, moreover, likely to be insecure without territory where it can
be safely stored. Land ownership allows a person to form complex plans
that unfold over time both by providing material resources to support
these plans and by providing a domain of exclusive control in which the
person may act without permission from others. To take a mundane
example, if I would like to construct and operate a car wash, I need both
money to purchase building materials and equipment and a physical
location suitable for building the car wash that is under my control. My
plan will be frustrated without either of these elements—without
financial resources, I cannot acquire materials, but materials alone are of
little use without a space in which I am entitled to build and operate a
cash wash if I so choose.
Although property rights are far from the only elements of a liberal
society, property rights have a special relationship to this conception of
what it is to be a free agent. In contrast to liability rules, which provide
only for monetary compensation in the event of damage to property,
property rules protect the property owner’s ability to make decisions that
have an effect over time without interference from others.225 A property
owner may pursue their own plans without permission from neighbors
or government officials. A liability rule, by contrast, protects the
financial interests of the right-holder, but does not give the right-holder
the security of being able to make exclusive decisions.226 An object
protected by a liability rule may be taken, damaged, or destroyed, and so
the owner’s intentions with respect to the object are not legally protected,
only her financial interest.227 Liability rules have the virtue of permitting
efficient transfers of resources that might not otherwise occur because of
transaction costs.228 Nevertheless, pure liability rules of this sort are not
especially common. Preference for defined spheres of control is,
perhaps, part of the reason why liability rules are commonly used to
provide compensation for unintentional damages such as accidents and
the like but relatively rare when it comes to intentional damages.

225. On the nature of property rules, see generally Henry E. Smith, Exclusion Versus
Governance: Two Strategies for Delineating Property Rights, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. 453 (2002);
JAMES E. PENNER, THE IDEA OF PROPERTY IN LAW (1997); Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas
Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85
HARV. L. REV. 1089, 1105-15 (1972).
226. Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 225, at 1092.
227. Id.
228. Id. at 1109-10.
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This analysis of the value of property ownership differs from the
most prominent version of the will theory of property in contemporary
legal theory. Unlike Margaret Radin’s account of the role of property as
constitutive of personhood, this strand of German Idealist thought does
not reply on the property being constitutive of personhood and is not
concerned with inalienability, sentimental value, or with the distinction
between fungible and non-fungible property.229 In general, the ability to
alienate property makes it more rather than less valuable as a means for
the exercise of free agency. And property can provide a sphere of
decisional authority in which to pursue plans over time regardless of
whether the owner identifies with it or believes it intrinsically important
to personhood. Even if objects of property are fungible and valued
entirely for their instrumental role in one’s projects, violations of
property rights may still pose a special threat to free agency. A small
business owner may value a business at far above its fair market value
not merely because of personal identification with the business, but of
the centrality of running the business to her life. In Radin’s terms, each
of the business assets may be fungible property for the owner in the sense
that they have only instrumental value and are fully replaceable with
goods readily available on the market.230 But the ability to conduct the
business might be so central to the owner’s life plans that the ability to
continue operating the business has tremendous non-financial value to
the owner. In this case, it is not some special personal relation to
particular objects of property that is important but rather the ability to
continue an activity that those objects enable. Conceptualizing noneconomic interests primarily as “personhood” interests disregards
important classes of normative concern.231
The role of property in providing a sphere in which to develop plans
over time provides reason to think that termination of an existing use or
structure is categorically different from the termination of a hitherto
unexercised option for future use. Terminating an existing use frustrates
229. Margaret Jane Radin, Property and Personhood, 34 STAN. L. REV. 957, 971-78
(1982). Serkin observes that the sort of value Radin is concerned with in “Property and
Personhood” has few implication for existing use protection. Serkin, supra note 6, at 127374. This is correct, but seems to miss the more important point which is that property rights
often have a special relationship to a person’s interests even when the object of property rights
are fungible objects of no particular sentimental value. Disrupting a small business might do
grievous damage to the important personal projects of the owner even if the property at
issue—the land and capital goods needed to operate the business—is of purely instrumental
value.
230. Radin, supra note 229, at 960 (defining “personal property” and “fungible property”).
231. Serkin addresses the non-pecuniary value of property largely in these terms and
therefore misses the important connection between property and freedom. See Serkin, supra
note 6, at 1269-70.
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the ongoing projects of the property owner. Businesses must be closed
or relocated, houses altered, tenants evicted. Frustration of an ongoing
project compromises part of the point of property ownership. By
contrast, protection of existing uses allows property owners to begin new
projects with confidence that these projects will not be disrupted by most
new land use regulations. Distinguishing between an owner’s interest in
pursuing ongoing projects and her interest in freedom to choose between
various options provides a principled reason to prohibit certain future,
but not existing, uses of land under most circumstances.232 This is
particularly the case when the existing use in question is a small business
because in such cases, the owner and (and perhaps key employees) have
a strong interest, both personal and financial, in not having their ongoing
projects disrupted by new regulation.
Serkin discounts the idea that existing use protection protects the
property owner’s subjective expectations of future use, but his reasons
for doing so are not compelling. Serkin seems to conflate interests
protected by a property rights with the extent of compensation available
if that right is “taken” within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment when
he argues that an owner’s subjective valuation does not justify special
protection for existing uses because subjective value not compensable in
takings cases.233 He remarks, “[i]f, instead, the concern is genuinely
with protecting subjective expectations—regardless of the impact on the
property’s fair market value—the result is simply inconsistent with core
takings doctrine. When it comes to prospective future uses, the law does
not even aspire to protect all genuine and reasonable expectations.”234
This is too cramped an understanding of property rights. As Henry
Smith has emphasized in a slightly different context, there is a gap
between the form of property rights and the values that they protect.235
Property rules create boundaries that provide a sphere of individual
control that may be valuable for any number of reasons. That only some
such interests are compensated in takings cases is not an argument for
ignoring such considerations when considering the value of existing use
protection. Successful takings claims entitle a plaintiff to compensation

232. See Frank I. Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical
Foundations of “Just Compensation” Law, 80 Harv. L. Rev. 1165, 1233 (1967) (describing
existing use protection as reflecting special concern for the “distinctly crystallized
expectation” of the landowner).
233. Id. at 1269-70.
234. Id. at 1276.
235. Henry E. Smith, Response, Mind the Gap: The Indirect Relation Between Ends and
Means in American Property Law, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 959, 962-63 (2009).
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for the fair market value of the property taken.236 But property rights
protect a range of interests beyond the market value of the property.
Among these are an owner’s subjective, above market valuation
(consumer surplus), personal autonomy, sentimental value, and business
goodwill.237 Just because these kinds of value are not compensable in
takings cases does not mean that they can be set aside when evaluating
the wisdom of existing uses protection. To the contrary, ignoring them
is a particularly serious mistake when analyzing the value of existing use
because a legal regime without existing use protection would not
compensate property owners for these sort of damages even in cases
where a zoning law is found to constitute a taking. As will be discussed
below, the failure to compensate business owners for lost goodwill is
particularly worrisome in light of the value of existing use protection for
small businesses.
This account of the will theory of property is largely congruent with
the scope of existing use protection. Rights vest in a non-conforming
use only when property owner takes a tangible, substantial step toward
development.238 In much the same way, the will theory of property
requires concrete action to establish ownership by communicating one’s
intention to incorporate an object into one’s future plans. Owners of
nonconforming properties are permitted to carry on their present
activities as long as they wish and make repairs necessary to do so, but
are generally not permitted to change to a new nonconforming use.239 In
most states, there is an exception for activities such as mining that, by
their nature, expand under the diminishing asset doctrine.240 The pattern
seems to be that past plans are respected, but future plans must conform
to the new code. Nonconforming use protection does not, however,
protect plans that would be disrupted regardless of the new zoning code.
Nonconforming structures destroyed by acts of god thus cannot be
reconstructed even though normal maintenance is permissible.241
Amortization of nonconforming uses is controversial in part
because it presents a difficult case under this theory of non-conforming
uses. Amortization has the benefit of allowing the property owner to
continue their present projects until they have recouped some or all of

236. Christopher Serkin, The Meaning of Value: Assessing Just Compensation for
Regulatory Takings, 99 NW. U. L. REV., 677, 678 (2005).
237. Id. at 679 n.4.
238. MANDELKER & WOLF, supra note 4, § 6.12.
239. ROHAN & KELLY, supra note 16, § 41.03[1].
240. See, e.g., Hansen Bros. Enters. v. Bd. of Supervisors, 907 P.2d 1324, 1324 (Cal.
1996).
241. See, e.g., Baird v. Bradley, 240 P.2d 1016, 1017 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1952).
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their investment.242
It also puts owners on notice that their
nonconforming uses will be terminated, giving them time to rearrange
their plans.243 Amortization is thus far more respectful of property
owners’ interests in developing their projects than is immediate
termination. In general, amortization is appropriate in the case of
discrete investments that are not embedded in some larger ongoing
project or for uses of open land such as junkyards. In such cases,
property owners will be able to recoup most of their investment and will
have time to adjust to the new legal circumstances.244 It is a less
satisfactory response for nonconformities that require ongoing
investments, including businesses and buildings. The problem with
amortization in such cases is that it threatens to make new investment
uneconomical such that owner’s enjoyment of the property will be
significantly compromised during the amortization period. A decaying
building or a small business starved of investment may not be sufficient
for the property owner to recoup prior investments. Amortization might
be better than nothing at all, but for nonconforming uses involving
complex commercial endeavors, amortization seems to seriously
compromise the value of property ownership by threatening the viability
of the owner’s personal or commercial plans. In light of the obvious
difficulties with amortizing whole businesses or residencies, it is
probably not coincidental that disputes over amortization provisions
have been disproportionately focused on nonconforming signs and
billboards.245
In response to frequent use of amortization to terminate
nonconforming signs and billboards, statutes have been enacted in many
states that forbid this practice.246 The foregoing argument provides
limited support for such statutes. Signs and billboards do not implicate
many of the interests at stake in other existing use cases. They are
typically not essential to ongoing projects. They do not require large
ongoing investments of the sort that makes amortization of business
problematic. There is little reason to think, therefore, that signs should
receive any special protection from land use regulation beyond an

242. Reynolds Jr., supra note 46, at 111 (1988).
243. Id. at 111.
244. See id.
245. See, e.g., Battaglini, v. Town of Red River, 669 P.2d 1082, 1082 (N.M. 1983); City
of Fort Collins v. Root Outdoor Advert., Inc., 788 P.2d 149, 149 (Colo. 1990); see generally
WILLIAMS, JR. & TAYLOR, supra note 4, § 124.6 (collecting amortization cases, a large
proportion of which involve junkyards or other open storage).
246. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 70.20(2) (2005); see MANDELKER & WOLF, supra note 4, §
5.78, n.422.
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amortization period to allow the owner to recover sunk costs.247 This
does not, however, justify broader use of amortization to terminate nonnuisance structures and uses.
B. Zoning and the New Logic of Property Rights
Under common law principles governing land use choices before
the advent of zoning, property owners had broad discretion to determine
what to build and what to do on their land so long as they did not interfere
with their neighbors’ use and enjoyment of their land. Property rules
protect a property owner’s freedom to choose between a range of options
by allowing the property owner to forbid others from entering the
property or interfering with it. Deference to landowners’ choices about
what to do with their property makes sense in light of this understanding
of property as closely connected to freedom both from interference by
the government and from one’s neighbors. There have always, of
course, been significant limitations on what property owners may do on
their property. Activities that burden neighboring property owners pit
the interests of property owners against one another and thus require
trade-offs between the interests of different landowners. Nuisance law
evolved to mediate these conflicts. For the most part, however, land use
decisions were made by property owners or their tenants.248
The rise of zoning and other land use regulation has substantially
changed the significance of property ownership. It is no longer true that
landowners have broad discretion about the use to which their land is
put. To the contrary, it is common in most developed areas for land use
regulations to place rather strict limits on what property owners may or
may not build or do. And local governments have broad powers to
impose new regulations. Today, a landowner in a suburban residential
247. Modjeska Sign Studios, Inc. v. Berle, 43 N.Y.2d 468, 478 (N.Y. 1977) (“In contrast
to a safety-motivated exercise of the police power, a regulation enacted to enhance the
aesthetics of a community generally does not provide a compelling reason for immediate
implementation with respect to existing structures or uses. True, the public will benefit from
a more aesthetically beautiful community, but absent the urgency present in a safetymotivated regulation, the immediate benefit gained does not outweigh the loss suffered by
those individuals adversely affected.”).
248. It is possible that highly concentrated land holdings have some utility in this context.
One possible virtue of feudal modes of land tenure is that landlords where in a position to
mediate land use conflicts between tenants and tenants between sub-tenants. Most cities have
long had fragmented land ownership. See Derek Keene, The property market in English towns,
A.D. 1100-1600 in: D’UNE VILLE À L’AUTRE. STRUCTURES MATERIELLES ET ORGANISATION
DE L’ESPACE DANS LES VILLES EUROPEENNES (XIIIe-XVIe siècle) 201, 221-25 (1989). But
until recently, the tendency of people to live and work in close proximity (often in the same
building) gave business owners incentive to mitigate the burdens that their businesses imposed
on neighbors. See generally Louis Wirth, Urbanism as a Way of Life, 44 AM. J. OF SOC.
(1938), https://www.jstor.org/stable/2768119.
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neighborhood is typically free to do what they wish with their property
so long as this does not involve commercial or industrial activity, does
not include apartments or other multi-family dwellings, does not involve
construction of buildings that are too high, too close to the property line,
painted the wrong color, and so forth.249 In other words, the property
owners are now often required to use their property in the same narrow
sort of way as their neighbors do and may construct only roughly the
same sort of buildings as their neighbors have. Unlike nuisance law,
which imposes a similar legal regime on all property owners in a
jurisdiction,250 zoning law creates a maze of highly local prohibitions
and permissions. Clearly, something important has changed.
Commentators hostile to zoning regulation sometimes present these
changes in a sinister light. Whereas before the introduction of zoning
regulations, individual property owners were free to choose their own
ends, today important decisions about uses of private lands are likely to
be taken by public authorities. Zoning skeptics such as Richard Epstein
argue that this turns private land into a sort of common resources subject
to dysfunctional collective management.251 The result, according to
these skeptics, are overregulated suburbs that artificially inflate home
prices for the benefit of incumbent owners and to the detriment of
landowners who wish to develop their property and any would-be home
buyers.252 On a more mundane level, homeowners with unusual plans
or tastes are at the mercy of the goodwill of their neighbors, in a context
where busybodies and those opposed to change are likely to play an
outsized role.
Whatever the force of this critique of zoning regulation as a general
matter, existing use protection plays an important role in preserving the
freedom of property owners to pursue projects of their choosing.
Whereas the pre-zoning system of property law gave property owners
broad discretion to choose what to do with their land, the present system
allows property owners to select a property zoned appropriately for their
intended use. Once they own a property with the right zoning for their
249. E.g.,
POINT ARENA, CAL., MUN. CODE
§
18.20.020
(2001),
https://qcode.us/codes/pointarena/view.php?topic=18-18_20-18_20_020.
250. Nuisance, CORNELL L. SCH., https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/nuisance (last visited
Aug. 20, 2021).
251. RICHARD EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF EMINENT
DOMAIN 265 (1985) (“Land use regulation places the land back into a modified common pool,
where many persons can limit the future use of the land, even though only one person, the
owner, can actually use it.”).
252. See generally Edward L. Glaeser & Bryce A. Ward, The Causes and Consequences
of Land Use Regulation: Evidence from Greater Boston, 65 J. URB. ECON. 265 (2009); see
generally Edward L. Glaeser et al., Why Have Housing Prices Gone Up?, 95 AM. ECON. REV.
329, 329 (2005).
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intended use and begin using it, they need not worry about subsequent
zoning changes and thus may, if they choose, pay little attention to local
zoning measures.253 Existing use protection thus assures property
owners that their activities will not be disrupted by new zoning law so
long as they are not especially noxious or burdensome. In return for
giving up some options with respect to their current property, they gain
far greater certainty about the activities of their neighbors as well as
additional protection against particularly burdensome activities. Insofar
as zoning rules are more or less efficient—a big if—higher property
values should make most incumbent property owners better off even
considering the inconveniences of being subject to voluminous zoning
codes.254
This new system of regulated private ownership relies on a
combination of markets in land and private property rights to achieve a
similar range of options for private property owners that was afforded
by the pre-zoning system of private ownership. If a property owner
wishes to commence an activity prohibited by the applicable zoning
rules (and she is not able to secure a variance or rezoning), she may
purchase land that is zoned for this purpose and may sell her current
landholdings to fund this purchase. The trade-off here is that property
owners face increased transaction costs (since commencing a new
activity may require buying a new parcel) in exchange for great certainty
about the activities of their neighbors. Whether or not this trade-off is a
good one, the new system does provide a similar range of options as well
as legal protection for land use choices that do not greatly burden
neighboring owners. This is because property owners know that if they
acquire a property zoned for their planned activity, their projects will not
be disrupted by new zoning regulations.
For property owners or would-be property owners, therefore, the
present legal regime affords a similar range of options as the pre-zoning
world, albeit with a different cost structure. For most landowners, the
burden of zoning regulation is not especially great. Two groups of
253. This sort of simplicity is an underappreciated benefit of grandfathering. Even if
homeowners and small business owners are likely to be able to defeat or be granted a variance
from any zoning measures that would have truly catastrophic effects on their interests, having
to pay attention to regulatory issues is itself a significant burden especially for those who are
not politically or legally sophisticated. Small businesses, of course, are still subject to ordinary
police power regulations and therefore face regulatory risk even when protected from
subsequent zoning changes. See, e.g., Elizabeth Joh, Opinion, Yes, States and Local
Governments Can Close Private Businesses and Restrict Your Movement, POLITICO (Mar. 18,
2020, 6:16 PM), https://www.politico.com/news/magazine/2020/03/18/states-police-powercoronavirus-135826.
254. William Fischel explains the spread and persistence of zoning largely in terms of
bottom-up demand from homeowners. FISCHEL, supra note 61, at 215-18.
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landowners, however, are significantly burdened by zoning laws in a
way that is not mitigated by existing use protection. First, property
owners who wish to develop or redevelop land may find their options
significantly constrained in ways that may greatly depress the value of
undeveloped land. Because developers do not usually obtain vested
rights in a project until they are have made considerable outlays, they are
particularly vulnerable to regulatory changes that might be made in
response to their planned developments. This is part of a pattern of antidevelopment legal changes over the course of the twentieth century.255
Whereas under the pre-zoning regime, property owners had a standing
right to develop their property subject to nuisance law and generally
applicable health and safety regulations, no such general right exists
today.
Landowners today are protected from restrictions on
development that are imposed through unfair or defective procedures or
that deprive them of any valuable use for their land.256 Local
governments, however, have a general authority to regulate development
on private land restrictively so long as they follow the correct legal
procedures and permit at least one valuable land use for any given parcel.
This change is reflected not only in zoning law, but also in a host
of other land use regulations that impede development or redevelopment,
such as historical landmark designations,257 wetlands protection laws,258
the Endangered Species Act,259 and a host of other environmental
measures. Whatever the wisdom of these laws, it is clear that the right
to develop has been severely curtailed in ways that go well beyond
zoning regulation. As Joseph Sax observed in 1983,
we are already so far along in diminishing developmental rights that
owners are viewed, in important respects, as already on notice.
Anyone today who holds, or wishes to buy, historical properties,
255. See, e.g., ALEXANDER VON HOFFMAN, CREATING AN ANTI-GORWH REGULATORY
REGIME: A CASE FROM GREATER BOSTON (2006), https://equitable-arlington.org/wpcontent/uploads/2019/09/exclusionary_vonHoffman.pdf.
256. See, e.g., Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1003 (1992) (holding that a
regulation that deprived a landowner of all economically valuable uses was a per se taking);
Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 391 (1994) (requiring that there must be “rough
proportionality” between proposed exaction and the impact of a proposed development);
Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist., 570 U.S. 595, 596-97 (2013) (holding that
landowners may sue for permit denials based on rejection of unreasonable demands by a local
government).
257. See, e.g., New York State Historic Preservation Act of 1980, 1980 N.Y. Laws ch.
354 (codified at scattered sections of N.Y. GEN. MUN. LAW, N.Y. PARKS, REC. & HIST.
PRESERV. LAW, AND N.Y. PUB. BLDGS. LAW); see, e.g., J. Langdon Marsh and Judith G.
Simon, The Protection of Historic Resources in New York State: An Overview of Federal,
State and Local Laws, 10 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 411 (1982).
258. California Coastal Act of 1976, CAL. PUB. RESOURCES CODE § 30255 (2020).
259. 16 U.S.C.A. §§ 1531-1544 (2020).
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wetlands or coastal lands, or who plans developments in developing
suburbs (to take but the most obvious examples), knows or should
know that his opportunities for old-fashioned development are far
from clear.260

Since that time, the Supreme Court has taken a more active role in
policing exactions,261 and there is also a recent trend toward suspicion of
restrictive, anti-development, zoning policies.262 Nevertheless, the
power of the state to prospectively limit intensive development has been
largely untouched.
Second, the neighbors of non-conforming properties are burdened
by the ability of their neighbors to contravene the applicable zoning
code. Junkyards, liquor stores, dirty or noisy industries, high-rise
apartments next to single family homes, busy retail businesses in quiet
residential neighborhoods, and so on impose real burdens on their
neighbors and are apt to lower property values. This is a cost of existing
use protection and one that doubtless has undesirable consequences in
the relatively small number of cases involving burdensome activities of
marginal economic value that cannot be limited by other means. There
are two reasons to think that this consideration should not be decisive.
First, there are numerous other tools to deal with the most burdensome
of nonconforming uses. Nuisances may be terminated outright by
zoning or by other regulations. Generally applicable police power
regulations can often be used to mitigate or prevent burdensome
activities even when zoning regulation is unavailable.263 In some cases,
neighbors will simply buy out a landowner conducting an unwanted
activity. Second, we should expect that neighbors of nonconforming
properties object to them less than most prospective buyers. In many
cases, neighbors bought property with knowledge of the presence of the
nonconforming use.264 Conversely, neighbors whose ownership pre-

260. Joseph L. Sax, Some Thoughts on the Decline of Private Property, 58 WASH. L. REV.
481, 494 (1983).
261. See, e.g., Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374 (1994).
262. See, e.g., EDWARD L. GLAESER, JENNY SCHUETZ AND BRYCE WARD, REGULATION
AND
THE
RISE OF HOUSING PRICES IN GREATER BOSTON
(2006),
https://www.hks.harvard.edu/sites/default/files/centers/rappaport/files/regulation_housingpri
ces_1.pdf; EDWARD GLAESER, TRIUMPH OF THE CITY: HOW OUR GREATEST INVENTION
MAKES US RICHER, SMARTER, GREENER, HEALTHIER, AND HAPPIER (2012); MATTHEW
YGLESIAS, THE RENT IS TOO DAMN HIGH: WHAT TO DO ABOUT IT AND WHY IT MATTERS
MORE THAN YOU THINK (2012).
263. See, e.g., Black Earth Meat Mkt., LLC v. Vill. of Black Earth, 834 F.3d 841, 844 (7th
Cir. 2016) (discussing a case in which local authorities successfully deployed police power
ordinances against a non-conforming slaughter-house that had recently drawn the ire of its
neighbors through significantly expanded operations).
264. See, e.g., id.
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exists the non-conformity will be more likely to sell and move if they are
bothered by it more than the average person.
V. EXISTING USES AND INSURANCE
The previous section sought to establish that existing use protection
is valuable because it preserves the right of property owners to build
structures and commence activities with full confidence that their plans
will not be disrupted by future changes in zoning laws. This protection,
it was argued, is especially valuable because one of the functions of
private ownership is to allow people to carry out projects over time. It
might be objected, however, that no plans are ever entirely secure and
that for most people most of the time, the risks of zoning changes would
be relatively small even without existing use protection. Moreover, one
might add, these risks might easily be outweighed by the potential
benefits of zoning changes. This defense of existing use protection, the
objection would continue, is just a long-winded way of expressing
skepticism about the utility of zoning regulation. If future zoning
regulation has a positive expected value, then it makes little sense to
curtail its application simply because things might turn out poorly.
Existing use protection, the argument concludes, is explained either by
irrational focus on downside risk or by the political power of incumbent
landowners with nonconforming uses who are able to insist on
grandfathering their properties even when this is not in the public
interest.
The question of whether to grant special protection to existing uses
is one species of a large class of “legal transitions” problems.265 When
laws change, the government can mitigate the effect of these changes by
providing “transition relief” for those adversely affected in the form of
“grandfathering,” delayed enforcement, or compensation.266 Existing
use protection is an example of the first, amortization an example of the
second, and eminent domain an example of the third. The legal
transitions literature has been centrally focused on tax policy and
eminent domain.267
Existing use protection has received less

265. See generally Kyle D. Logue, Legal Expectations, Rational Expectations and Legal
Progress, 13 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 211 (2003-04).
266. See generally id.
267. See, e.g., Louis Kaplow, An Economic Analysis of Legal Transitions, 99 HARV. L.
REV. 509, 517 (1986) [hereinafter Kaplow, An Economic Analysis]; Louis Kaplow, Transition
Policy: A Conceptual Framework, 13 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 161, 202-03 (2003)
[hereinafter Kaplow, Transition Policy]; see DANIEL SHAVIRO, WHEN RULES CHANGE: AN
ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL ANALYSIS OF TRANSITION RELIEF AND RETROACTIVITY 36-43
(2000); Logue, supra note 265, at 226-27.
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attention.268 The wisdom of providing transition relief to those who
relied on the old legal rule depends strongly on the relative value of
deterrence and insurance.269 Deterrence refers not only to the
enforcement of the new rule but also to the desirability of encouraging
regulated parties to anticipate future regulations and make choices that
are efficient in light of their best estimate of the probability of future
regulations.270 One problem with transition relief is that it undermines
the incentive to anticipate future regulations. For example, if a factory
owner is confident that her factory will not be subject to subsequent
pollution regulations because of a “grandfather” clause in the regulation,
she will have less incentive to invest in pollution control technology.
Insurance refers to the mitigation of the risk of legal change.271 Like
private insurance for natural disasters or for accidents, transition relief
insures regulated parties against future regulation by reducing the costs
of making choices today that run afoul of these regulations tomorrow.
For example, the “takings” clause implicitly insures property owners
against the risks of eminent domain by promising compensation if the
government decides to exercise its eminent domain powers.272 A final
consideration is that transition policies differ in the incentives that they
provide for government policy-makers. For example, compensation as
a transition relief policy might deter the government from introducing
socially inefficient regulation.
Exempting certain parties from
regulation changes political dynamics and thus influences which
regulations are actually enacted.
The ex ante appeal of transition relief is that it mitigates risk. In
this sense, it functions like insurance. A policy of grandfathering
existing factories under environmental regulation reduces the regulatory
risk associated with manufacturing. Of course, this does not come for
free. Insofar as transition relief reduces risks for some parties, it
undermines the efficacy of new regulation by, for example, allowing
more pollution than would a regulation without a grandfather clause.
And so, the efficiency costs of transition relief must be weighed against
the risk mitigation value of insurance. Not surprisingly, this analysis
often suggests skepticism about transition relief because there are sharp
limits to the extent to which the benefits of risk spreading may outweigh

268. One exception is Steven Shavell, On Optimal Change, Past Behavior, and
Grandfathering, 37 J. LEGAL STUD. 37, 74-76 (2008).
269. Logue, supra note 265, at 217-18.
270. Id.
271. Id. at 217-18.
272. U.S. CONST. amend. V.

798

SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW

[Vol:61

the costs of regulatory inefficiencies.273 Legal theorists critical of the
dominant trend have identified a number of factors that militate in favor
of transition relief. These include cases in which regulated parties are
unlikely to anticipate future changes in regulatory policy,274 cases in
which new regulations are not overwhelmingly likely to be an
improvement over the status quo,275 cases in which parties complying
with the old law would face high costs in changing their behavior to
comply with the new law and the benefits of complying with the new
rather than the old law are incremental.276 Zoning regulation has all of
these features.
The value of “insurance”—statutory protection for existing uses
that assures property owners that their land use choices will be
grandfathered under subsequent zoning regulations—is substantial. As
argued above, the value of being able to make land use choices that will
be respected in the future is an important part of the connection between
property and freedom. The efficiency argument against grandfathering
would be more compelling in the case of existing uses if all landowners
were well-capitalized corporations with diverse business interests. The
interest of public corporations in forming and carrying out plans over
time can be reduced to purely financial interests. They are likely to be
reasonably sophisticated in evaluating regulatory risk. And most large
corporations can usually afford to “self-insure” (i.e., pay the full cost if
it comes to that) for the sort of losses at issue here. This is one of the
economies of scale enjoyed by large enterprises. Large corporations
could, therefore, find it preferable to forgo existing use protection in the
name of greater regulatory efficiency. The attitude of individual
corporations is likely to depend overwhelmingly on their line of
business. Corporate interests likely to be targeted by zoning laws
(industrial concerns, real estate developers) are both more likely to favor
grandfathering and more likely to take a strong interest in land use
policy.
Land use regulations, however, are more likely to affect individual
homeowners and small businesses as large corporations.277 For
273. See, e.g., Shavell, supra note 268, at 78 (discussing the skeptical view of
grandfathering found in the legal transitions literature); Kaplow, An Economic Analysis, supra
note 267, at 584-87; Michael Graetz, Legal Transitions: The Case of Retroactivity in Income
Tax Revision, 126 U. PA. L. REV. 47, 68-73, 87 (1977).
274. See Logue, supra note 265, at 260.
275. See id.
276. See Shavell, supra note 268, at 78.
277. Retail locations selling the products of large corporations are often owned by
franchisees. Small business owners in such cases bear much of the location-specific regulatory
risk.
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individual homeowners and small businesses, land and buildings are
likely to be a significant proportion of their net worth. They are less well
positioned to absorb significant losses from regulatory change and more
likely to be deterred by even relatively small risks of rezoning. They,
therefore, may be deterred from purchasing or expanding homes or
businesses even when a less risk-sensitive actor would not be. And they
are likely to care deeply when their plans for the homes and businesses
are disrupted in a way that goes beyond their financial interests.278
Public corporations do not care about personal autonomy as such, but
natural persons, in both their private and professional lives, certainly do.
Individuals and small businesses also vary greatly in their
sophistication about regulatory matters. Some homeowners and
business owners pay a great deal of attention to local politics and may
be positioned to assess regulatory risk. But others do not. Evolutionary
dynamics will tend to eliminate large corporations that do not correctly
evaluate regulatory risk.279 But this is not true for individuals.280 It is
not appropriate, therefore, to assume a high degree of legal
sophistication even for parties with an incentive to be concerned with
future land use regulation. This means that the benefits of giving
property owners greater incentive to anticipate future zoning changes
may be quite modest in most cases. One virtue of existing use protection
is that it lowers the stakes for most parties and makes it easier to run a
small business without worrying much about zoning changes. Requiring
small businesses to do so will tend to favor large, legally sophisticated
commercial organizations and disfavor most small businesses.
Focusing regulatory changes on future, but not present uses, leaves
developers highly vulnerable to changes in zoning law because zoning
regulations may be changed in anticipation of unwanted developments.
However, developers may, as a general matter, be well positioned to bear
the risks of a somewhat unpredictable regulatory regime. They are likely
to be well-capitalized. As specialists in, among other things, evaluating
regulatory risk, they are relatively well-positioned to assess the
likelihood that a development project will be foiled by imposition of land
use regulations. Abolishing blanket protection for existing uses would
tend to make developers more cautious about “racing” to beat imminent
zoning changes. But insofar as this is the real problem, it could be
278. This is a part of what Michelman referred to as “demoralization costs” in his classic
article on compensation for takings. Frank I. Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness:
Comments on the Ethical Foundations of “Just Compensation” Law, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1165,
1214 (1967).
279. Logue, supra note 265, at 213.
280. Id.
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addressed by modifying vested rights doctrine without disrupting
existing use protection in other contexts. The benefits of cancelling
existing use protection for those who purchase properties from
developers may be rather modest. Subsequent buyers may not be either
well equipped to evaluate regulatory risk or able to self-insure. Unless
subsequent buyers are able to accurately gauge regulatory risk,
abolishing existing use protection might slightly lower the prices at
which developers are able to sell across the board rather than disfavor
specifically those projects likely to conflict with future zoning
regulations. This would have the effect of discouraging development in
general rather than discouraging development that is undesirable in light
of future regulatory changes.
Other considerations also weigh in favor of grandfathering existing
uses and structures. As Steven Shavell has argued, grandfathering is an
attractive approach to legal transitions when choices made in reliance on
the prior law reduce the efficiency gains under the new law.281 What
might be an inferior legal rule in the abstract is less unattractive to the
extent that people have ordered their affairs so as to comply with it and
reordering their affairs to comply with the new law would be
expensive.282 This is especially true when the efficiency gains from the
new regulation are modest. Reliance on property law is extensive.
Homes are built or modified, businesses opened, investments made, and
so on. The web of reliance interests is complex and extends beyond
owners and renters of property.283 For example, employees may choose
to work at a particular business because of its convenient location or
purchase a home because it is near their place of employment. Even
when zoning laws are excessively permissive, people can mitigate their
effect in various ways. The presence of a noisy or otherwise disruptive
business may influence the design and layout of buildings on nearby lots.
People who are less sensitive to the burdensome use may choose to
purchase nearby properties in the same way that those who do not mind
airplane noise might save money on housing by living near an airport.
Structures and uses that would be proscribed by an ideally efficient
zoning code may therefore do less harm than might appear at first blush.
The flip side of this observation is that the gains from new zoning
laws are often rather modest. The case against grandfathering is
281. See Shavell, supra note 268, at 68-70.
282. Id.
283. Eduardo M. Peñalver, Land Virtues, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 821, 830-31 (2009) (“The
collective interdependence of individual land uses reinforces their inertial power. Once in
place, land uses presuppose and reinforce one another in ways that make it difficult to undo
one piece without affecting many others.”).
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strongest in areas such as product liability and health and safety
regulation in which it is desirable to encourage regulated parties to
anticipate harms to their customers and employees and take preventative
measures before regulators act.284 Zoning regulation, however, has a
much more attenuated connection to health and safety.285 Insofar as a
land use poses the sort of direct hazard to health that would make it
analogous to product liability torts, it almost certainly constitutes a
nuisance and thus may be regulated even under existing doctrine. Local
governments also have broad powers to regulate non-nuisances that pose
threats to health or safety outside of the zoning code under their police
powers health or safety. In any case, the vast majority of zoning
regulation is not meant to deter threats to life or limb.286
A careful examination of the purposes of zoning regulation
suggests that only some of the aims of zoning law would be served by
the elimination of non-conformities. One of the noteworthy features of
American zoning law is its sheer scope. As William Fischel remarked,
“section 1 of the SZEA delegates to the municipality the power to control
virtually every aspect of private development.”287 The objectives of
zoning regulation are, not surprisingly, extremely varied. A nonexclusive list of the basic aims includes separation of conflicting land
uses, restriction of demand for public services, aesthetic regulation,
restriction of unwanted development, and environmental protection.288
Serkin focuses on separation of conflicting land uses and on aesthetic
regulation, which are areas in which the persistency of non-conformities
does tend to undermine the purposes of zoning regulation.289 The effect
of existing use protection in other areas is more ambiguous.
VI. IMPLICATIONS FOR TAKINGS LAW
Even if one were to accept Serkin’s diagnosis that existing uses are
treated with too much deference,290 his cure might be worse than the
disease. Serkin points out that protection of existing uses “put enormous
pressure on such amorphous tests such as vested rights, the harm
exception for takings liability, and the minimum duration of

284. Logue, supra note 265, at 229-30.
285. See Jones v. City of Los Angeles, 295 P. 14, 17 (Cal. 1930)
286. See id. at 17.
287. FISCHEL, supra note 61, at 138.
288. See, e.g., Zoning and Land Use Planning, WORLD BANK, https://urbanregeneration.worldbank.org/node/39#:~:text=The%20purpose%20of%20zoning%20is,down
%20development%20in%20specific%20areas (last visited Apr. 2, 2021).
289. See generally Serkin, supra note 6.
290. Serkin, supra note 6, at 1228.
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amortization provisions”291 and complains that “[t]hese tests do nothing
to advance the clarity of land use doctrine and actually obstruct a more
direct inquiry into the character and magnitude of a regulation’s effects
on property rights.”292 Serkin concludes that existing uses should
receive no special statutory or constitutional protection but instead
should be subject to the same takings and due process analysis as other
land use regulations.293 In many cases, this analysis would suggest that
the existing use should be protected, but in others, it would not.294
There is an internal tension in Serkin’s position here. He objects to
doctrines such as vested rights and minimum amortization periods on the
grounds that they are unclear and do not track the interests actually at
stake.295 But his proposed solution is to repeal the existing uses
exception to zoning codes and thus expose more properties to land use
regulations that will trigger constitutional challenges. Encouraging
courts to use takings and substantive due process analysis to scrutinize
regulations that attack existing uses, in theory, might allow courts to
grapple with the real normative considerations in each case. But, in
practice, there is little reason to believe this would result from takings
analysis and almost none for substantive due process. It is very doubtful
that this change would bring greater order or predictability to land use
jurisprudence. Neither federal nor state courts have, to this point, shown
much interest in grappling with the nuances of the policy issues raised
by zoning cases.
Without statutory protection for existing uses, courts must use
constitutional protections for property rights to separate impermissible
from impermissible regulations. Assuming that the zoning authority
follows the appropriate process to enact new regulation, there are two
types of constitutional claims that might be used to attack regulations
targeting existing uses: takings claims and substance due process claims.
The results might be far from salubrious for either area of law.
Regulatory takings are an intricate and, to almost everyone,
unsettling body of law that is notorious for its unclarity.296 There are two
291. Id. at 1290.
292. Id.
293. Id.
294. See id.
295. Id.
296. Bradley C. Karkkainen, The Police Power Revisited: Phantom Incorporation and the
Roots of the Takings “Muddle”, 90 MINN. L. REV. 826, 827 (2006) (“Regulatory takings law
is by most accounts a ‘muddle.’ ” ); Holly Doremus, Takings and Transitions, 19 J. LAND USE
& ENVTL. L. 1, 1 (2003) (“Regulatory takings doctrine is . . . famously incoherent.”); see
generally Jane B. Baron, Winding Toward the Heart of the Takings Muddle: Kelo, Lingle, and
Public Discourse About Private Property, 34 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 613 (2007); Charles M.
Haar & Michael Allan Wolf, Euclid Lives: The Survival of Progressive Jurisprudence, 115
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categories of per se regulatory takings: cases involving physical invasion
of the affected property297 and cases involving deprivation of any
economically valuable use of the property.298 Most cases in which a
nonconforming use is terminated will not fall into either category of per
se taking because the regulation does not involve any physical invasion
of property and will typically leave some economically productive use
of the land even if one of less value. In such cases, a court must then
turn to the Penn Central test, which directs it to consider (1) the
“economic impact” of the regulation (2) the extent to which it “has
interfered with distinct investment-backed expectations,” and (3) “the
character of the government action.”299 The majority opinion in Penn
Central suggests that the fact that a regulation terminates an existing use
is relevant on at least the second and third prongs of the analysis.300
Existing uses are typically associated with some degree of investmentbacked expectations. And interference with existing uses rather than
options for future use might be thought to be relevant to the character of
government action, although the extent to which this is the case will
depend on how plausible a court finds the considerations adduced above
in favour of existing use protection convincing. Even scholars who do
not favour especially broad understandings of the takings clause suggest
that imposition of transition costs on a small subset of similarly situated
parties raise special concerns.301
HARV. L. REV. 2158, 2169-70 (2002) (“The cacophony of opinions in Palazzolo and TahoeSierra Preservation Council v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, the Court’s most recent
efforts to amplify and apply the regulatory takings approach, comprises a cry for help by a
badly divided Court. The Takings Clause has proved to be an unwieldy and potentially
devastating tool for balancing private rights and public needs . . . . All that lawyers and judges
have to show for their efforts is a body of law that nearly all observers acknowledge is
hopelessly confused, with no immediate resolution in sight.”) MARGARET JANE RADIN,
REINTERPRETING PROPERTY 146 (1993) (“The takings issue is also remarkably intractable
. . . . Judicial efforts to develop a coherent takings doctrine have met with consistently telling
criticism . . . . The sight of such a pervasive and central field of law in apparent disarray has
enticed many able theorists, but their critical commentary has been more convincing than their
efforts to reconstruct.”).
297. See, e.g., Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419 (1982).
298. See, e.g., Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
299. Penn Centr. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978).
300. Id. at 136 (“Unlike the governmental acts in Goldblatt, Miller, Causby, Griggs, and
Hadacheck, the New York City law does not interfere in any way with the present uses of the
Terminal . . . [T]he law does not interfere with what must be regarded as Penn Central’s
primary expectation concerning the use of the parcel. More importantly, on this record, we
must regard the New York City law as permitting Penn Central not only to profit from the
Terminal but also to obtain a ‘reasonable return’ on its investment.”).
301. Doremus, supra note 296, at 13 (“Law has always shaped property rights. That is not
inherently problematic. What is problematic is a regulatory transition too drastic or abrupt to
permit any response, or imposition of the costs of transition on only a subset of similarly
situated landowners.”).
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In practice, however, it is unclear how the fate of non-conforming
uses would play out if statutory protections were removed. As a general
matter, federal courts are hesitant to weigh in on local zoning issues,
seeing this as primarily a state and local matter.302 Although state courts
could develop more aggressive takings jurisprudence than mandated
under federal law—some states even have “takings” clauses in their own
constitutions—few appear eager to do so.303 Instead, state courts tend to
be very deferential to local government when hearing takings claims.304
State courts tend to be deferential to the government when applying the
Penn Central test.305 In a statistical study of takings cases, James Krier
and Stewart Sterk found that “state courts have come close to developing
a categorical rule that regulatory actions do not constitute takings unless
they are governed by one of the Court’s two per se takings rules.”306
Nevertheless, attacks on existing uses are somewhat of an exception to
this rule being the one area in which claimants have some hope of
success under Penn Central.307 Although this trend emerges from an
analysis of a large sample of takings cases, its doctrinal basis is less
certain as state courts tend to be less than clear in their analysis when
applying Penn Central. Krier and Sterk note that “[w]e surely cannot
say that state courts roundly ignore the rules, but we do have the
impression that they wander off untethered to an unsettling degree.”308
302. See e.g., Cenergy-Glenmore Wind Farm #1, LLC, v. Town of Glenmore, 769 F.3d
485, 487 (7th Cir. 2014) (“We note at the outset, however, that federal courts, as we have
explained time and again, are not zoning boards of appeal. State and local land-use decisions
are entitled to great deference when constitutional claims are raised in federal court.”) (internal
citations omitted) (citing General Auto Serv. Station v. City of Chicago, 526 F.3d 991, 1000
(7th Cir. 2008); Discovery House, Inc. v. Consolidated City of Indianapolis, 319 F.3d 277,
283 (7th Cir. 2003); Centres, Inc. v. Town of Brookfield, 148 F.3d 699, 704 (7th Cir.1998);
River Park, Inc. v. City of Highland Park, 23 F.3d 164, 165 (7th Cir. 1994); Polenz v. Parrott,
883 F.2d 551, 558 (7th Cir. 1989)).
303. James E. Krier & Stewart E. Sterk, An Empirical Study of Implicit Takings, 58 WM.
& MARY L. REV. 35, 93 (2016) (“Regarding the ambitions of state governments to protect
private property more than the Court says they must, state courts and legislatures on the whole
do not seem particularly interested in moving significantly beyond the constitutional bottom,
with just a few exceptions.”); FISCHEL, supra note 61, at 333 (“The U.S. Supreme Court’s
constitutional floor for regulatory takings—no physical invasion and some scintilla of
economic use—has become in effect the ceiling in the state courts.”).
304. Krier & Sterk, supra note 303, at 89 (“Our survey demonstrates that state courts, in
turn, have been content to respect decisions made by the political branches.”).
305. See id. at 94 (“When regulation is at issue, state courts, like the Supreme Court,
appear content to leave local officials accountable to voters, not to judges, despite the oft-cited
concern that land use regulation has the potential to single out victims who may have little
clout in the local political process.”).
306. Id. at 64.
307. Id. at 67 (“Successful takings claims almost always involve some interference with
an existing use.”).
308. Id. at 92.
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This should not be surprising since state constitutional land use law is no
closer to being a model of doctrinal order and perspicuity. As Norman
Williams Jr. and John M. Taylor have noted, “A literal-minded reading
of the case law will show that, in perhaps nine out of ten cases involving
constitutional questions, there is no indication as to which constitutional
doctrine was involved.”309 If state court judges do not even make clear
what doctrines their land use cases are decided under, asking to craft a
nuanced response involving the careful application of the complex Penn
Central test is asking much.
The likely effect of removing statutory protection for existing uses
would be to subject a large new groups of regulations to a legal standard
so vague and confusing that leading commentators have remarked that
“[i]t would dignify the approach too much to describe it as a multifactoral test or even a balancing test.”310 It is likely that given the
sensitivities around terminating non-conforming uses and the
sympathies of at least some number of judges for such claimants,311 the
number of successful claims would not be entirely trivial. Nevertheless,
there is significant danger that such a solution would leave us with the
worst of both worlds, providing enough litigation risk to deter local
governments from making use of their new power to terminate nonconforming uses when this might be appropriate, while failing to provide
an adequate remedy for more than a small number of deserving
claimants.
In addition to the problems with the substance of regulatory takings
claims, there are serious difficulties with the remedies available to the
owners of non-conforming properties. It is widely recognized that
compensation in terms of fair market value undercompensates those
whose property is taken by eminent domain.312 There are pragmatic
reasons to limit compensation in takings cases to market value. Courts
are usually poorly positioned to assess super-market subjective
valuations of owners, especially when plaintiffs have an incentive to
309. WILLIAMS, JR. & TAYLOR, supra note 4, § 4.3.
310. DAVID A. DANA & THOMAS W. MERRILL, PROPERTY: TAKINGS 131 (2002).
311. See, e.g., Bettendorf v. St. Croix Cty., 631 F.3d 421, 435 (7th Cir. 2011) (Hamilton,
J., dissenting) (“I do not mean to suggest that local government can never change the law to
prohibit an existing lawful use without effecting a compensable taking of property. The United
States Supreme Court has avoided such a bright line, as have the Wisconsin courts. But apart
from the nuisance or noxious use cases, such cases are at best rare.”).
312. See Lee Anne Fennell, Taking Eminent Domain Apart, 2004 MICH. ST. L. REV. 957,
962 (“It is a truism that fair market value – the usual benchmark for ‘just compensation’ does
not compensate landowners completely.”). But see generally Brian Angelo Lee, Just
Undercompensation: The Idiosyncratic Premium in Eminent Domain, 113 COLUM. L. REV.
593 (2011) (arguing that fair market value compensation for property taken by eminent
domain does not unfairly undercompensate property owners).

806

SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW

[Vol:61

overstate their valuations. And some of the damage done by a taking,
such an interference with the autonomy of the property owner, may not
be readily monetizable even under perfect information. Furthermore,
one might worry that high compensation will discourage worthwhile
regulations and uses of eminent domain. Given that the doctrine
governing compensation for takings is unlikely to change, compelling
more property owners to resort to takings claims in the face of new
zoning regulations will only compound the under-compensation
problem.
Although residential property might be thought to typically involve
more consumer surplus than commercial property, the undercompensation problem is particularly acute for commercial property in
other respects. Business goodwill is not usually considered property for
the purposes of takings analysis.313 Even when courts find that a
regulation constitutes a regulatory taking, compensation is usually
calculated in terms of lost property value, not foregone profits.314 In
some cases, the two measures will be roughly equivalent. But where an
affected business has a great deal of goodwill, a regulatory taking that
disrupts an existing enterprise might result in diminution of profits that
are far greater than diminution of property value. The failure of takings
jurisprudence to protect goodwill, future profits and other such interests
beyond the fair market value of property is one motivation for protection
of existing uses. Amortization policies exist in part to allow property
owners to realize these sorts of value before they are subject to the new
regulatory regime. To the extent that property owners are not able to
recover lost profits, even successful takings claims may not provide
adequate compensation for their losses. And this, in turn, only
313. E.g. Sawyer v. Commonwealth, 65 N.E. 52, 53 (1902) (“It generally has been
assumed, we think, that injury to a business is not an appropriation of property which must be
paid for. There are many serious pecuniary injuries which may be inflicted without
compensation. It would be impracticable to forbid all laws which might result in such damage,
unless they provided a quid pro quo . . . . But a business is less tangible in nature and more
uncertain in its vicissitudes than the rights which the Constitution undertakes absolutely to
protect. It seems to us, in like manner, that the diminution of its value is a vaguer injury than
the taking or appropriation with which the Constitution deals.”).
314. Rose Acre Farms, Inc. v. United States, 559 F.3d 1260, 1268 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (“[T]he
vast majority of takings jurisprudence examines, under Penn Central’s economic impact
prong, not lost profits but the lost value of the taken property.”); THOMAS J. MICELI &
KATHLEEN SEGERSON, COMPENSATION FOR REGULATORY TAKINGS: AN ECONOMIC
ANALYSIS WITH APPLICATIONS 15 (1996) (“Most takings cases since Pennsylvania Coal have
generally applied some form of Holmes’s diminution of value standard.”). Although future
profits are not compensable under federal law, several states require payment of consequential
damages in certain kinds of eminent domain cases. Christopher Serkin, The Meaning of Value:
Assessing Just Compensation for Regulatory Takings, 99 NW. U. L. REV. 677, 687-88 n.47
(2005).
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strengthens the bargaining power of local governments seeking to settle
claims for substantially less than a court would award a successful
claimant.
Whereas removal of statutory protection for non-conforming uses
would introduce a great deal of uncertainty about the scope takings
claims that would result for local governments exercising their new
authority, the situation with respect to substantive due process claims is
more clear. Land use regulations can be invalidated as a matter of
substantive due process if they lack “any reasonable justification in the
service of a legitimate governmental objective,” or are arbitrary.315 This
inquiry tends to be deferential to regulatory authorities.316 Courts
usually uphold a regulation if the government can advance some
plausible rationale.317 This seems to follow from a broader tendency for
judges to try to avoid resolving land use regulation disputes, which often
might be thought to turn on factual nuances and the particulars of local
context.318 Termination of a non-conforming use is unlikely to be
arbitrary by virtue of its non-conformity since the feature that renders a
property non-conforming is its violation of the applicable zoning
regulation (particular state actions against non-conformities might, of
course, turn out arbitrary for any number of reasons idiosyncratic to the
case in question). And the implementation of even rather onerous zoning
regulations must surely be considered, for better or worse, a legitimate
governmental objective nearly one hundred years after Euclid.319 It is
unlikely, therefore, that removing categorical protection for existing uses
will result in careful weighing of costs and benefits by a court as is
Serkin’s hope. Current practice suggests that courts hearing substantive
due process claims from owners of non-conforming properties will find
for the government unless the court views the government’s actions as
manifestly irrational. The choice, therefore, would not be between
protection of existing uses and judicial weighing of costs and benefits,
but between statutory protection of existing uses and judicial deference
to regulations that appear minimally rational.

315. Cty. of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 845-46 (1998).
316. See Daniel R. Mandelker, Litigating Land Use Cases in Federal Court: A Substantive
Due Process Primer, 55 REAL PROP. TR. & EST. L.J. 69, 109-21 (2020) [hereinafter
Mandelker, Litigating Land Use]; FISCHEL, supra note 61, at 93 (“As applied to zoning,
substantive due process has seldom provided relief for aggrieved property owners or
developers, especially after the 1930s, when the Supreme Court adopted a highly deferential
view of New Deal legislation.”).
317. See Mandelker, Litigating Land Use, supra note 316, at 115-19.
318. See, e.g., Cenergy-Glenmore Wind Farm #1, LLC, v. Town of Glenmore, 769 F.3d
485, 487 (7th Cir. 2014); FISCHEL, supra note 61, at 127.
319. Euclid v. Amber Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
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Serkin’s contention that repealing the exemption for existing uses
will result in a more direct judicial inquiry into the character and
magnitude of a regulation’s effect on property rights suffers from two
fundamental problems.320 The first is that courts approach to substantive
due process and, to a less extent, takings claims in the land use context
is highly deferential to local government so long as the government
avoids per se regulatory takings. The second is that the applicable test
for regulatory takings is so vague that if courts do not defer to local
governments, a great deal of legal uncertainty would result. Although it
is theoretically possible that a new raft of land use takings cases would
jolt the judiciary into crafting rules for termination of existing uses that
provide both practical guidance to property owners and local
governments and reach a reasonable result in terms of policy, the more
likely outcome would be that takings jurisprudence would muddle on in
much the same way it has in the over forty years since Penn Central.
Even in the unlikely event that legal doctrine settled in just about the
right place and greater flexibility for zoning authorities to terminate
existing uses in some instances raised the average quality of regulatory
policy, it is not clear that these benefits would outweigh the greater legal
uncertainty and litigation expenses that would result in having the
judicial conduct searching analysis of the policy merits of zoning laws
targeting pre-existing uses. The risks are not worth it. Such a step would
be exciting for property law experts, but ominous for landowners, taxing
for judges and perplexing for local government attorneys and their
clients.
VII. CONCLUSION
Statutory protection for existing uses is sound public policy.
Although it did not fit the vision of most of the original proponents of
comprehensive zoning, it has become an accepted part of zoning practice
for good reasons that flow from the nature of zoning law and the
normative function of property rights. Vigorous elimination of
nonconformities that do not constitute nuisances is justified only on a
model of zoning that elevates strict separation of uses over other
objectives. As zoning regulation has developed, however, it has become
clear that its core function is to guide development rather than to resolve
pre-existing land use conflicts. When combined with existing use
protection and other police power authority, zoning regulation allows
local government to implement land use plans and eliminate the most
noxious uses while allowing landowners to make investment and pursue
320. See generally Serkin, supra note 6.
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long term plans in reliance on the existing zoning rules. In a context in
which land use regulations are arguably too onerous in many urban
areas,321 protection of existing uses is a valuable check on fiscal zoning.
Protection for existing uses reflects two underlying commitments.
First, private property is valuable in part because it provides individuals
with a sphere in which they can exercise exclusive control.322 Part of the
value of this private sphere is the ability to carry out one’s plans and
projects over time. From this point of view, frustration of an ongoing
project is a different sort of harm than elimination of a future option.
Protection of existing uses allows property owners to begin new projects
with confidence that these projects will not be disrupted by most new
land use regulation. Distinguishing between an owner’s interest in
pursing ongoing projects and her interest in freedom to choose between
various options provides a principled reason to prohibit certain future,
but not existing, uses of land under some circumstances. Because of this
asymmetry, existing use protection may be justified even in cases where
it does not maximize property values. It is especially valuable for
homeowners and small business owners who may not be sophisticated
about regulatory risk and who are not likely to have the ability to “selfinsure” against future land use regulations.
By contrast, a zoning regime in which existing uses were not
respected would leave landowners uncertain about the future legal status
of their activities even if they are careful to acquire land that presently
has zoning designation that fits their plans. Landowners would not only
lose control over the types of use permitted on their land, they would not
be able to rely on the zoning designation of any property acquired to
pursue a particular activity. This would leave almost any commercial or
industrial project perpetually at the mercy of zoning authorities and
substantially undermine the degree to which property ownership protects
the freedom of choice of property owners.
The second commitment is a hesitance to use zoning law to resolve
land use conflicts between existing legal uses. A land use conflict exists
when two nearby landowners lawfully develop their property in a way
such that at least one of the uses reduces the value of the other use. There
are various possible ways to resolve the conflict. Private bargaining
might resolve the conflict. If one use is a nuisance or otherwise violates
police power regulations, one of the landowners could sue the other. Or
the government could try to eliminate one of the uses as a public
321. See, e.g., Glaeser & Ward, supra note 252; Glaeser et al., supra note 252, at 329-33;
see generally YGLESIAS, supra note 262.
322. See generally LOCKE, supra note 215; see generally KANT, supra note 217; see
generally HEGEL, supra note 217; see generally FICHTE, supra note 217.
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nuisance. Finally, the local government could use land use regulation to
prohibit one of the two uses. The protection of existing users reflects a
policy of refraining from using zoning law to resolve this sort of conflict
and letting the chips fall where they may. Resolution of pre-existing
land use conflicts by regulation involves reallocation of rights and
wealth between neighbors and disrupts the common law regime that
regulates relations between neighbors. Aggressive use of zoning law
upsets this equilibrium between neighbors and unsettles the allocation of
decisional authority that property rules are meant to fix.
The compromise that emerged from the controversy over zoning
laws in the early twentieth century was that zoning regulations would be
permitted to significantly impinge on the unfettered discretion of
property owners but that pre-existing activities or structures that did not
constitute nuisances would generally be permitted to continue. The
argument of this Article is that although this was not the original
intention of the early proponents of zoning, the political process ended
up in the right place. Existing use protection is often viewed as a grubby
concession to current property owners necessary to soften political
opposition. This attitude is a mistake. Existing use protection instead
reflects the adaptation of traditional property rights in land to modern
conditions.

